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INTRODUCTION 
Sometimes, a picture really is worth a thousand words.  A 
photograph of French emergency rescue workers laboring at the crash site of 
Germanwings Flight 9525 near Seyne-les-Alpes, France, on March 24, 2015, 
is one such picture. Likewise, it is true that a picture can also launch many 
thousands of additional words, as is the case here. For that photo encapsulates 
what proves to be a lengthy story about a commercial airline flight in which 
a co-pilot with a serious mental disability meticulously planned and executed 
the stunning murder of 144 passengers and 5 fellow crew members while 
simultaneously committing suicide.1 On March 24, 2015, the co-pilot 
intentionally locked the aircraft’s captain out of the cockpit during a 
bathroom break and set the Airbus A-320 aircraft on a crash course into the 
“Massif des Trois-Évêchés, a range of 9,000-foot peaks northwest of Nice,” 
France.2 
The suicidal-homicidal pilot, Andreas Lubitz, had his first 
documented episode of “major depression” in 2008, while in a Lufthansa-
sponsored pilot training program, from which he had to drop out at age 21.3 
He returned to his hometown in Germany, and began outpatient psychiatric 
care: 
Lubitz spent nine months in the psychiatrist’s care. In July 
2009, only six months into the treatment, the doctor declared 
that “a considerable remission had been obtained” with the 
meds and recommended in a letter to German aviation 
officials that Lubitz be allowed to resume his training in 
Bremen: “Patient alert and mentally fully oriented, with no 
retentivity or memory disorders. Mr. Lubitz completely 
recovered, there is not any residuum remained. The 
treatment has been finished.” Yet the doctor continued to 
treat Lubitz—and prescribe him powerful drugs—through 
                                               
1. Joshua Hammer, “For The Love Of God! Open This Door!”: The Real Story Of 
Germanwings Flight 9525, GQ (Feb. 22, 2016), https://www.gq.com/story/germanwings-
flight-9525-final-moments.  The photograph described in the text appears in this article with 
the caption, "Somehow, amid a vast field of debris scattered over a mountainside in the French 
Alps, the cockpit voice recorder was located less than a half hour after the first of the first 
responders arrived on the scene."  Id.  Details of the events described in this popular article 
can be confirmed by the report of French aviation authorities. Bureau d’Enquêtes Et 
d’Analyses Pour La Sécurité De L’aviation Civile--Ministère De l’Ecologie, Du 
Développement Durable Et De l’Energie, Preliminary Report: Accident on 24 March 2015 
at Prads-Haute-Bléone (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence, France) to the Airbus A320-211 
registered D-AIPX operated by Germanwings, Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses, (May 
2015), https://www.bea.aero/docspa/2015/d-px150324.en/pdf/d-px150324.en.pdf. 
 2. Hammer, supra note 1. See also Rene L. Duncan, The Direct Threat Defense under 
the ADA: Posing a Threat to the Protection of Disabled Employees, 73 MO. L. REV. 1303 
(2008). 
 3. Hammer, supra note 1. 
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October, three months after having assured officials that 
Lubitz had fully recovered. German aviation officials took 
several more months to restore Lubitz’s student pilot’s 
license and his fit-to-fly medical certificate, amending them 
with the designation SIC, for “specific regular examination.” 
This notation would stay on Lubitz’s record. Any further 
psychiatric treatment for depression, any more meds, would 
result in his automatic grounding. As Lubitz was surely 
aware, this would almost certainly mean the end of his flying 
career.4 
When Lubitz was to go for his actual in-aircraft flight training at 
Lufthansa’s facility in Arizona, he lied in his application to the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) by stating that he’d never been treated for 
mental illness.5 German aviation officials, with whom the FAA cross-
checked airman certificate applications, ferreted out this lie.6 Yet, simply 
because Lubitz confessed when confronted with his lie, FAA and German 
officials allowed him to proceed with his flight training, which he 
completed.7 However, new psychiatric troubles surfaced in late 2014, and by 
early 2015, 
Lubitz was certain he was going blind. He began visiting 
ophthalmologists and neurologists at the rate of three or four 
appointments a week, complaining that he was seeing stars, 
halos, flashes of light, streaks, and flying insects. He was 
also suffering from light sensitivity and double vision. “He 
was full of fear,” one ophthalmologist noted. Doctors 
examined his eyes and brain using a variety of state-of-the-
art equipment, but found nothing wrong. One neurologist 
diagnosed him with a “hypochondriacal disorder.” Lubitz, 
according to the doctor’s records . . . “repeated with 
remarkable frequency and detail the nature of the symptoms 
affecting his vision, and was unable to accept suggestions of 
alternative diagnoses, including ones positing psychological 
causes. In fact, he broke off treatment at this point.” His 
family doctor diagnosed an “emergent psychosis” and urged 
him to check himself into a psychiatric clinic. Lubitz ignored 
her.8 
                                               
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
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At the urging of Lubitz’s mother, he returned to consult with the 
psychiatrist who had treated him for his first episode of major depression.9 
“Lubitz began psychotherapy and—even as he continued his normal work 
and flight schedule—again took the powerful meds mirtazapine and 
lorazepam.”10 Lubitz, however, did not notify Lufthansa, nor—incredibly—
did his psychiatrist, even though under German law they were required to do 
so.11 12 
Unaware of his worsening disability, Lufthansa continued to put 
Lubitz as first officer in the cockpit of regional commercial flights in its 
budget-carrier, Germanwings.13 During this time in which he co-piloted 
dozens of flights, Lubitz’s mind took a sinister turn: 
By early March, Lubitz’s thoughts drifted toward death. He 
searched the Internet for the most efficient means of 
committing suicide: “producing carbon monoxide”; 
“drinking gasoline”; “Which poison kills without pain?” On 
March 18, a Düsseldorf physician wrote a sick-leave note for 
Lubitz, effective for four days, indicating that Lubitz 
suffered from “a persistent vision disorder with a thus far 
unknown origin.” A couple of days later, while at home, a 
new method of self-extinction took shape in his mind. That 
evening, March 20, he searched the Internet for information 
about the locking mechanism on an Airbus A320 cockpit 
door.14 
And that is exactly what Lubitz did on March 24, 2015, two days 
after the day he had marked in his diary as “Decision Sunday.”15 He locked 
the Captain out of the A320 cockpit while co-piloting Germanwings Flight 
9525, from Barcelona to Dusseldorf, and meticulously set the aircraft’s 
autopilot on a crash-course with a French mountain.16 
[The Captain] returned three minutes later, at 10:34. On a 
keypad outside the cockpit, he punched in his access code, 
then hit the pound sign. Access denied. “It’s me!” he 
exclaimed, rapping on the door. Flight attendants—
preparing to wheel their snack-and-beverage carts down the 
aisle now that the plane had reached cruising altitude—
looked toward the commotion. A closed-circuit camera 
                                               
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
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transmitted the captain’s image to a small television screen 
inside the cockpit; Lubitz didn’t react. Alarmed, [the 
Captain] started hammering on the door. Still, Lubitz didn’t 
respond. “For the love of God,” the [Captain] yelled. 
“Open this door!” The plane was at about 25,000 feet. 
Passengers, feeling the steep decline now and gripped by the 
first wave of panic, began leaving their seats and moving 
through the aisles.17 
At the moment the plane crashed into the French Alps, the Captain 
was hammering at the cockpit door with a crowbar he’d had a flight attendant 
retrieve.18 
The aftermath included “families [who] were flown to Marseille and 
then bused to Le Vernet, the village closest to the crash site, where they 
attended the mass burial of several tons of human remains that could not be 
identified through DNA testing.”19 
Consideration of a real-world event can put theoretical discussions 
of law into useful perspectives – if, for no other reason, by elucidating the 
real-world stakes at issue in how the law is understood and applied. 
The example in this prologue did not occur in the United States, or 
within the legislative jurisdiction of the United States Congress to legislate 
employment discrimination laws. 
However, it just as well could have.20 
On the other hand, workers with mental impairments are also quite 
vulnerable to irrational stereotypes, hastily drawn false analogies, and 
suspicions of co-workers and management whose pernicious influence can 
seem obvious yet very difficult to prove by admissible evidence.21 Not every 
pilot who experiences depression is an Andreas Lubitz. Not every employee 
who has a mental impairment is a threat to co-workers.22 Indeed, experience 
                                               
 17. Id. (emphasis added). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. In the article, the photograph was reproduced with the following caption: 
“Eleven weeks after the crash, a convoy of hearses carried the remains of victims to the 
German town of Haltern am See, home to 16 high school students and two teachers who were 
casualties of Lubitz’s monstrous act.” Photo: Rolf Vennen Bernd/ EPA/ Corbis. Id. 
 20. See, e.g., Witter v. Delta Air Lines, 966 F. Supp. 1193, 1195–97 (N.D. Ga. 1997), 
aff’d, 138 F.3d 1366 (11th Cir. 1998). The author was co-counsel along with William H. 
Boice, Esq., and Kilpatrick & Cody, representing Delta Air Lines and Dr. Michael Berry of 
Houston, Texas, in the case. Id. at 1195. 
 21. See Andrew Hsieh, The Catch-22 Of ADA Title I Remedies For Psychiatric 
Disability, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 989, 990–91 (2014) (narrating a hypothetical situation in 
which a worker with Asperger’s Syndrome is fired in the wake of media reports suggesting in 
the wake of the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting, “that people with autism spectrum 
disorders” – such as the shooter, Adam Lanza – “might be more prone to violence because 
they lacked a ‘capacity for empathy.’”) 
 22. See id. 
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and statistics both show that the vast majority of workers with mental 
impairments are successful in the workplace.23 
What is the framework in which the ADA separates the truly 
dangerous from the truly stereotyped? Is that framework effective?24 
Nearly twenty years ago, in the early years of the Americans With 
Disabilities Act (ADA),25 the author published an article in which he 
explained the ADA’s approach to “qualification standards” for employment, 
and discussed a special provision of the ADA that allows employers to 
exclude applicants and employees from employment in which they pose “a 
direct threat to health or safety,”26 a term of art peculiar to the ADA and to 
its federal-law ancestor, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.27 In that article, the 
author observed that the ADA permits 
employers that use “qualification standards” to demonstrate 
that the qualifications are lawful even though they may 
disadvantage protected individuals. Qualification standards 
are the “personal and professional” job requirements 
established by the employer that “an individual must meet in 
order to be eligible for the position held or desired.” These 
attributes may include “skill, experience, education, 
physical, medical, safety and other requirements.” In a 
highly relevant though vague provision, the ADA states that 
qualification standards “may include a requirement that an 
individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety 
of other individuals in the workplace.” The statutory 
definition of “direct threat” provides little additional 
insight–“‘direct threat” means a significant risk to the health 
or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable 
accommodation”—and in fact raises more questions than it 
answers. For example, which events pose a cognizable 
“risk” to others? What risks are “significant”? What 
information is required to establish that a “significant risk” 
exists? What accommodations must be considered to 
                                               
 23. As eloquently explained by a long-time friend of the author from his law practice 
days, when the author spoke on panels with Andrew J. Imperato, Esq., who was then serving 
as Counsel to EEOC Member Paul Stephen Miller. See AAPD, Countdown to the ADA – 
AAPD Speaks to Andy Imparato, YOUTUBE (Jul. 9, 2009) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v
=yVA5TQNnVYM. Mr. Imperato is currently the Executive Director of the Association of 
University Centers on Disabilities (AUCD). Leadership, ASS’N OF UNIV. CRTS. ON 
DISABILITIES, https://www.aucd.org/template/page.cfm?id=148 (last accessed Sept 2, 
2018). 
 24. See John A. Conway, The Americans with Disabilities Act: New Challenges in 
Airline Hiring Practices, 59 J. AIR L. & COM. 945 (1994), for some early thoughts about these 
questions in context of the safety-sensitive commercial airline industry. 
 25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2012). 
 26. 29 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2012). 
 27. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (2012). 
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“eliminate” the risk? How much risk must be “eliminated” 
before an accommodation is considered sufficient? How do 
the nature of the employment and the magnitude of the 
potential harm affect the analysis?28 
After examining the origins of the direct-threat standard and its 
reification in Section 103 of the ADA,29 the author observed: 
Ultimately, these are not legal questions within the province 
of courts or juries. The courts do not have the medical or 
scientific competency to answer such questions in a 
systematic way. Instead, the “direct threat” standard leaves 
courts and juries to make medical judgments, which is 
unsatisfactory because, although they are “neutral arbiters,” 
they are “generally less skilled in medicine than the experts 
involved.” At best, courts and juries must pick and choose 
among the competing medical opinions offered by parties in 
litigation. This is exactly what the AMA in Arline stated was 
not to be the function of the courts. Moreover, the litigation 
process requires parties to “hire” medical professionals to 
support their respective positions. For plaintiffs who do not 
have the out-of-pocket resources to hire a medical 
professional with the required competency, or even to hire 
one at all, the judicial approach to “direct threat” 
assessments is likely not to work in their favor. Moreover, 
given the nature of litigation itself, the judicial approach is 
unlikely to provide effective consistency, continuity, and 
above all, accuracy in the regulation of employment in 
safety-sensitive industries.30 
Thus, the author suggested that the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) use its rulemaking power to issue regulations that 
provided for a medical panel review process to make the determination of 
whether an employee or applicant poses a disqualifying “direct-threat” in any 
litigation under Title of the ADA in which “direct threat” is an issue.31 
So, what has happened over the intervening 19 years from the 
author’s article appearing in the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy to 
today? 
                                               
 28. Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “Typhoid Mary” Meets the ADA: A Case Study of the “Direct 
Threat” Standard Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
849, 851–52 (1999) [hereinafter “Typhoid Mary”]. 
 29. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2012). 
 30. Typhoid Mary, supra note 28, at 956–957 (citing Sch. Bd of Nassau Cty v. Arline, 
480 U.S. 273 (1987), quoting Knapp v. Nw. Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 485 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
 31. Typhoid Mary, supra note 28, at 957–58. 
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The EEOC has not, in fact, exercised its rule-making powers to 
improve “direct-threat” assessments. Even more distressingly, direct threat 
litigation under the ADA certainly has not moved to a more science-and-
expertise based determination. In fact, it appears that a movement has drifted 
in precisely the opposite direction. In a 2015 opinion from a panel in the U.S. 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, an astonishing proposition has been 
propounded.32 That proposition is that to disqualify an employee or applicant 
from particular employment on the basis that s/he poses a “direct threat” 
under the ADA, the employer does not have to satisfy the jury that the 
employee or applicant actually poses a “direct-threat.”33 Instead, the 
employer must merely prove that the employer “reasonably believed” the 
employee or applicant posed a direct threat.34 
Management-side employment lawyers have been quick to jump on 
this decision as a boon to employers. “ADA Direct Threat Defense Just Got 
A Little Easier,” crowed a headline in a national legal publication.35 Similar 
pronouncements have been made.36 
In the balance of this article, we first discuss some issues both 
resolved – and un-resolved – in the “direct-threat” standard in the nearly 20 
years since the author’s earlier argument was published (Section I). We next 
discuss the key issues to be addressed in this article – in an ADA lawsuit, 
“who decides whether an individual poses a ‘direct threat’ to health or safety, 
and what exactly does that decider decide?”—in Section II. In so doing, we 
will place the Beverage Distributers decision into a larger context of five 
possible approaches to this problem: 
                                               
 32. EEOC v. Beverage Distribs. Co., 780 F.3d 1018, 1021–22 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Brittany Blackburn Koch, ADA “Direct Threat” Defense Just Got A Little Easier, 
NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/ada-direct-threat-
defense-just-got-little-easier. 
 36. E.g., Michael R. Lied, Court: Employer May Rely on Reasonable Belief That 
Disability Posed Direct Threat, CHI. L. BULL. (Apr. 2, 2015), https://howardandhoward.com
/user_area/uploads/CDLB%20-%20Lied%204-2-15.pdf. 
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Each one of these approaches will be discussed and a critique of each 
will be offered in Subsections II.A through II.D. Included within this survey 
will be discussions of two recent cases from the Seventh37 and Sixth38 
Circuits that take different – but not necessarily more productive – positions 
on the “who decides and what does the decider decide” question. In Section 
III, we will explore anew how the author’s proposal for using a tripartite 
medical review model of expert medical consultation can make the “direct 
threat” standard workable for safety-sensitive industries, including how 
safety-sensitive industries can use legal developments in mandatory 
arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (which have transpired since my 
original article). It is the author’s position that this model is essential to 
ensure the kind of expert medical decision-making that the author believed 
in 1999, and still believes, to be the only sensible way for properly 
harmonizing a disabled individual’s ADA rights with the public’s right to 
safety—especially by preventing staggering tragedies like that of 
Germanwings Flight 9525 while preserving employment opportunities and 
workplace protections for the millions of individuals with a mental 
impairment who do not pose threats to health and safety. Section IV offers a 
summation and concluding observations. 
I. PERSISTENT DIRECT-THREAT ISSUES, BOTH SETTLED AND 
UNSETTLED 
Early in the enforcement of the ADA and the litigation of “direct-
threat” cases, two issues arose that proved to be particularly vexing. The first 
                                               
 37. Stragapede v. City of Evanston, 865 F.3d 861 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 38. Michael v. City of Troy Police Dep’t, 808 F.2d 304, 307, 309 (6th Cir. 2015); see 
also Wurzel v. Whirlpool Corp., 482 Fed.App’x. 1, 12 (6th Cir. 2012). 
Who’s the decider, and what does that decider decide?  OPTIONS: 
(1) Employer, in good faith 
(2) Employer, if employer can get a medical opinion (and 
“reasonably believes” that the individual poses a direct threat) 
(3) Employer, if employer can get a medical opinion with which 
the jury agrees 
(4) The jury gets to decide, considering evidence from both sides 
(5) The decision should be made through a model of expert 
medical consultation 
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issue was whether the “direct-threat” standard applies to risks of harm posed 
predominantly to the individual with a disability, as opposed to others in the 
workplace or with whom the individual would be interacting or for whom the 
individual would be responsible.39 The second issue was whether the “direct-
threat” issue was an affirmative defense for the employer to prove, as the 
statutory structure suggests; or whether if the employer challenges the 
individual as a “direct- threat,” the individual is left to sue the employer for 
discrimination under the ADA and to prove that s/he is not a direct threat as 
part of proving the prima facie showing that s/he is “a qualified individual 
with a disability, who can perform the essential functions of the job in 
question, either with or without reasonable accommodation.”40 As we 
elaborate below, one of these issues has been settled — at least, unless or 
until the U.S. Supreme Court overrules its administrative-deference rule in 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.41 — and the 
other issue remains mired in a conflict among the U.S. Appeals Courts that 
have ruled on it, and remains entirely open in several Circuits, including the 
Sixth Circuit, that have yet to rule upon it. 
A. “Direct Threats” to Self? 
The statute speaks of threats “to the health or safety of other 
individuals in the workplace” when it defined “direct threat.”42 The statute 
did not, however, say that an individual whose disability poses a significant 
risk of substantial harm to the disabled individual solely (or primarily) is a 
direct threat. Thus, an early question that arose under the ADA is does the 
“direct-threat” standard apply to threats to the health or safety of the 
individual, rather than of others?43 
Employers soon began pushing for an expansion of what we shall 
call the “threatened class” so that it included risks posed by a disabled 
individual only to the individual, not others.44 This view had the potential to 
expand the scope of disqualified individuals substantially by extending the 
“direct-threat” defense not only to employees or applicants whose work 
                                               
 39. See Typhoid Mary, supra note 28, at 864 n.60. 
 40. See id. at 865 n.64. 
 41. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984). 
 42. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(3)(2012)(“The term ‘direct threat’ means a significant risk to the 
health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation” (emphasis 
added)); 42 U.S.C. 12113(b)(2012) (“The term ‘qualification standards’ may include a 
requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other 
individuals in the workplace.”(emphasis added)). The legislative history of these sections 
includes a House and Senate report that does not endorse the “threat to self” gloss on “direct 
threat,” and a House Labor Committee Report that does. See Amanda J. Wong, Comment, 
Distinguishing Speculative And Substantial Risk In The Presymptomatic Job Applicant: 
Interpreting The Interpretation Of The Americans With Disabilities Act Direct Threat 
Defense, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1135, 1148–51 (2000). 
 43. See Wong, supra note 42, at 1143. 
 44. Id. at 1145–46. 
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might be done separate and apart from others, but also to those who were in 
“pre-symptomatic” stages of a disability, where the employer sought to argue 
that employing the individual in a particular job would increase the risk of 
harm from the underlying condition.45 This raised concerns that the ADA 
could be turned on its head to disadvantage the very groups of individuals it 
was enacted to help: 
The problem is that if direct threat is interpreted to 
encompass risk to self and other . . . then a loophole is 
created that allows employers to avoid potential liability by 
simply not hiring those who are at potential risk of injury or 
disease. Adverse employment decisions based on 
speculation and future risk of injury are illegal under the 
ADA; but if an employer is able to characterize speculation 
regarding future risk of injury as a direct threat to self, then 
it becomes a valid reason for disqualification.46 
Of even greater concern to some advocates for the rights of disabled 
individuals was—and is—the potential for paternalism inherit in a “direct-
threat’ to self” regime. “Even if the employer’s intentions are not suspect and 
his actions are taken out of a genuine concern for the individual,” wrote a 
commentator, “individuals with disabilities have questioned whether the 
employer should be allowed to make this decision on behalf of the employee” 
because “[a]llowing the employer such power illustrates the paternalism that 
disability rights groups and individuals with disabilities feared.”47 
The EEOC of the President George H.W. Bush Administration, 
however, looked to the fact that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, on which the 
ADA was to a degree modeled, had been interpreted by two federal courts as 
extending “direct threat” exclusion to significant risks of substantial harm 
posed by the disabled individual himself or herself.48 Its regulation 
implementing Sections 12101(3) and 12113(b) of the ADA defined the 
direct-threat defense to encompass both risks to others as well as risks to the 
disabled individual posed in performing the job in question.49 The position 
espoused by the EEOC has been denounced as a continuing sign of pro-
employer prerogative and anti-disabled individual paternalism, which 
“allows employers to treat people with disabilities differently from other 
minorities even though the courts and society have refused to allow 
overprotective rules against women,”50 such as in the famous case of United 
                                               
 45. Id. at 1142–46. 
 46. Id. at 1145. 
 47. Id. at 1145–46. 
 48. Id. at 1151–52 (citing Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985); 
Bentivegna v. US Dep’t of Labor, 694 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
 49. 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(r)(2012). 
 50. D. Aaron Lacy, Am I My Brother’s Keeper: Disabilities, Paternalism, And Threats 
To Self, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 55–56 (2003). 
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Auto Workers v. Johnson Control, Inc.,51 in which the Supreme Court 
invalidated a battery manufacturer’s rules to keep women of child-bearing 
years out of certain, high-paying operations within the plant without 
imposing the same restriction on men in their years of fertility.52 According 
to some advocates, the EEOC’s regulation encourages “employers to claim 
they know what is best for individuals with disabilities and to continue to 
keep individuals with disabilities as a subordinate class” at a time when 
“society generally allows adults to decide for themselves what risks are too 
great to take in choosing where to work.”53 Thus, the EEOC’s regulation was 
denounced as “a paternalistic infringement on the right of a person with a 
disability to make the decision to work in a dangerous environment,” a 
restriction which “infringes on the right of a person with a disability to have 
full control and autonomy to make decisions about what is in his best 
interest.”54 
The federal appeals courts split on whether the EEOC’s rule was a 
permissible exercise of agency discretion under the Chevron standard, with 
the Eleventh Circuit implicitly saying “yea,”55 the Ninth Circuit saying 
“nay,”56 and the Seventh Circuit trying to occupy some middle ground.57 
When the Ninth Circuit decision reached the U.S. Supreme Court, it ruled, 
5–4 that the “yeas” prevailed58—and the EEOC’s regulation stood, despite 
its anomalous relationship to plain statutory language and the predominance 
of the legislative history, because of deference to administrative agencies 
charged by statute to make regulations implementing a federal statute.59 In a 
rare opinion by Justice Souter not to have drawn a single dissent, the Court 
                                               
 51. United Auto Workers v. Johnson Control, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 191–92, 211 (1991). 
 52. Id. at 200–11 (applying Title VII § 703(a)). 
 53. Lacy, supra note 50, at 56. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 447 (11th Cir. 1996). Several other 
federal appeals court decisions also assumed that “threats to self” were encompassed within 
direct threats. See, e.g., LaChance v. Duffy’s Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832 (11th Cir. 1998); 
EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 1997); Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 
695 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 56. Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 226 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 536 U.S. 73 
(2002). 
 57. Koshinski v. Decatur Foundry, Inc., 177 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing 
Kohnke v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 1110, 1111–12 (N.D. Ill. 1996)). As the Seventh 
Circuit observed: 
Koshinski argues that the ADA is not a paternalistic statute designed to protect a disabled 
person from himself, and that an employee should not be fired or otherwise denied 
employment because he may become unwilling to do his job at some point in the future. In 
principle we do not disagree with Koshinski’s argument. It would be hard to imagine, for 
example, that a court would sanction an employer’s decision to fire a qualified employee 
simply because his degenerative heart disease makes a future heart attack inevitable. 
Koshinski, 277 F.3d at 603. 
 58. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 76 (2002). 
 59. Id. at 84–85. 
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held that the EEOC’s regulation was within the goalposts of permissibility 
established by Chevron deference: 
Since Congress has not spoken exhaustively on threats to a 
worker’s own health, the agency regulation can claim 
adherence under the rule in Chevron so long as it makes 
sense of the statutory defense for qualification standards that 
are “job-related and consistent with business necessity.” 42 
U.S.C. § 12113(a). Chevron’s reasons for calling the 
regulation reasonable are unsurprising: moral concerns 
aside, it wishes to avoid time lost to sickness, excessive 
turnover from medical retirement or death, litigation under 
state tort law, and the risk of violating the national 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1590, 
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.60 
After examining the potential effects under OSHA, for example, of 
employing someone who posed a “direct threat” to himself or herself alone, 
the Echazabal Court concluded, “[t]he EEOC was certainly acting within the 
reasonable zone when it saw a difference between rejecting workplace 
paternalism and ignoring specific and documented risks to the employee 
himself, even if the employee would take his chances for the sake of getting 
a job.”61 
At the time of the writing of this article, shortly after its presentation 
at the Symposium that was its raison d’être, a new sheriff, so to speak, 
entered town.62 And that sheriff — Justice Brett Kavanagh63 — is reputed to 
be mighty skeptical of Chevron deference.64 As former Tenth Circuit federal 
appeals court judge and current Stanford Law School faculty member and 
senior fellow at the Stanford University’s Hoover Institute, Michael 
McConnell,65 has predicted: 
                                               
 60. Id. at 84. 
 61. Id. at 86. 
 62. A famous photograph of William O. Douglas when he became the second Chairman 
of the Securities & Exchange Commission comes to mind. See BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD 
BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, AMERICA’S MOST CONTROVERSIAL 
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 466 app. at 6 (2003) (photograph of William O. Douglas wearing a 
ten-gallon hat with a Colt revolver on his desk, captioned, “A new marshal in town: Douglas 
as Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, prepares to do battle”). 
 63. Robert Barnes, Ann E. Marimow & Marissa J. Lang, At Kavanaugh’s Supreme 
Court Debut, Protesters Outside, Business As Usual Inside, Washington Post, Oct. 9, 2018. 
 64. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Overturning Chevron Would Not Gut the Administrative 
State—but It Would Strengthen the Rule of Law, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 13, 2018, 10:04 
AM), https://reason.com/volokh/2018/08/13/overturning-chevron-would-not-destroy-th 
(noting then-Judge Kavanaugh’s skepticism of Chevron). 
 65. Michael McConnell, HOOVER INST., https://www.hoover.org/profiles/michael-
mcconnell (last visited Nov. 11, 2018). 
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The late Justice Antonin Scalia was an enthusiast for the 
Chevron doctrine, at least in its early years, but Judge (now 
Justice) Neil Gorsuch and Judge (now nominee) Brett 
Kavanaugh have been powerful critics. They argue that 
Chevron deference is an abdication of the court’s Article III 
duty to independently interpret the law, and that it 
aggrandizes the power of the executive branch at the expense 
of both the legislative and the judicial. If Kavanaugh is 
confirmed, it seems likely that one of the most significant 
changes will be the curtailment if not outright abandonment 
of Chevron deference.66 
This article shall not digress into an examination of then-Judge 
Kavanaugh’s opinions or dissents while a member of the D.C. Circuit that 
deal with Chevron deference – that is an enterprise of much labor, requiring 
much subtlety, which must be left to others.67 It suffices here to make two 
observations. First, then-Judge Kavanaugh has questioned Chevron 
deference in a high-profile scholarly publication.68 Second, Justice Souter’s 
application of Chevron deference to uphold the EEOC’s “direct threat to self” 
gloss on a perfectly clear and unambiguous statute remains open to 
question—and some scholars have called it wrongly decided, inviting efforts 
to overturn it.69 Whether that portends a future, successful challenge by those 
who would see Echazabal, and in turn the EEOC’s regulation, overturned is 
a matter that remains gestating in the womb of time.70 
B. Is “Direct Threats” an Affirmative Defense—or an Element of 
an ADA Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case? 
A split among federal appeals courts has existed for quite some time 
about whether the presence of a direct threat must be proven by an employer 
as an affirmative defense—or whether a worker challenging an adverse 
                                               
 66. Michael McConnell, Kavanaugh And The “Chevron Doctrine”, Defining Ideas: A 
Hoover Inst. J., THE HOOVER INSTITUTION (Jul. 30, 2018), https://www.hoover.org/research/
kavanaugh-and-chevron-doctrine. 
 67. See Kent H. Barnett, Christina L. Boyd & Christopher Walker, Judge Kavanaugh, 
Chevron Deference, and the Supreme Court, THE REGULATORY REVIEW (Sept. 3, 2018), 
https://www.theregreview.org/2018/09/03/barnett-boyd-walker-kavanaugh-chevron-
deference-supreme-court/. 
 68. Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118 
(2016) (Reviewing HON. ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)). 
 69. Craig Robert Senn, Fixing Inconsistent Paternalism Under Federal Employment 
Discrimination Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 947, 996 (2011) ( “[T]he Court wrongly decided 
Echazabal for three distinct reasons.”). 
 70. A phrase that appears in Justice Benjamin Cardozo’s unpublished concurring 
opinion in the (in)famous—depending on one’s perspective—Hughes Court 5–4 decision in 
the “Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Case,” Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 
U.S. 398 (1934); ANDREW M. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 501–02 (1998). 
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employment action must prove, as part of the prima facie case, that s/he does 
not pose a direct threat.71 The author noted this dissonance in 1999.72 As he 
explained at the time: 
The awkwardness of the organization of the ADA’s 
provisions arises from the fact that (1) it is part of an 
employee’s case to prove that he or she meets the employer’s 
lawful qualification standards; (2) the “direct threat” test is 
such a qualification standard; (3) yet the statutory provision 
regarding “direct threats” appears as a “‘defense to a charge 
of discrimination,” suggesting that it is an affirmative 
defense to be pled and proved as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b) by the employer. The courts, however, have not agreed 
who should bear the burden in the “direct threat” cases. 
Some courts, relying on the peculiar structure of the statute, 
have ruled that it is an affirmative defense, while others have 
ruled that the ability to perform a job without posing a 
“direct threat” is part of the plaintiff’s burden to establish his 
or her qualifications to perform the essential functions of a 
job.73 
This circuit split persists in 201874 and is limned in the following 
chart: 
  
                                               
 71. See, e.g., Rene L. Duncan, Direct Threat Defense under the ADA: Posing a Threat 
to the Protection of Disabled Employees, 73 MO. L. REV. 1303, 1313–14 (2008) (discussing 
EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 477 F.3d 561, 571–72 (8th Cir. 2007), which noted the Circuit 
split and ruled it to be an affirmative defense); Ann Hubbard, Understanding and 
Implementing the ADA’s Direct Threat Defense, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1279, 1337–1345 (2001). 
 72. See Typhoid Mary, supra note 28, at 942 & n. 411. 
 73. Id. at n. 411. 
 74. Steven F. Befort, Direct Threat and Business Necessity: Understanding and 
Untangling Two ADA Defenses, 39 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. (forthcoming 2018). 
2019] INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS VERSUS PUBLIC SAFETY 163 
An annotated version of this chart, with detailed footnotes, appears as the 
Appendix to this article. 
 
Which of these approaches actually makes sense? Judge Edith Jones 
made the best case for imposing the burden on the individual – but it is not 
all that persuasive a case.75 On the other hand, Professor Steven Befort, in a 
recent article, corralled all of the justifications for treating “direct threat” as 
an affirmative defense, and came up with five separate rationales.76  
However, the author, taking a textualist approach, thinks that the language of 
the statute itself establishes beyond doubt that Congress intends direct threat 
                                               
 75. See McConnell, supra note 66. 
 76. Legislative history; treatment afforded other ADA defenses; EEOC viewpoint 
expressed in its Enforcement Guidance document on Psychiatric Disabilities; practical 
advantages of the employer in terms of knowledge of the job and the business; vindication of 
Congressionally stated purpose of ending stereotyping of disabled individuals by making 
employer prove them unfit rather than making them prove themselves fit. See Befort, supra 
note 74, at 29–31. 
Circuit Party With Burden Case Authority 
1st Usually Plaintiff EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135, 144 
(1st Cir. 1997) 
2nd Defendant Lovejoy–Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, 
Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 220 (2d Cir.2001) 
3rd Undecided New Directions Treatment Servs. v. 
Reading, 490 F.3d 293, 306 n.9 (2007) 
4th Uncertain No 4th Circuit Appeals Court opinion 
decides. 
5th Inconclusive Rizzo v. Children’s World Learning Ctrs, 
213 F.3d 209 (5th Cir. 2000) (en banc);  
Nall v. BNSF Railroad Company, 917 
F.3d 335, 343 n. 5 (5th Cir. 2019) 
6th Undecided Wurzel v. Whirlpool, 482 Fed.Appx. 1, 12 
n.14 (6th Cir. 2012) 
7th Defendant Branham v. Snow, 392 F.3d 896, 906 (7th 
Cir.2004) 
8th Defendant EEOC v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 477 F.3d 
561, 571 (8th Cir.2007) 
9th  Defendant Echazabal v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 336 
F.3d 1023, 1027 (9th Cir.2003) 
10th It Depends Jarvis v. Potter, 500 F.3d 1113, 1122 
(10th Cir. 2007) 
11th  Plaintiff Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 
446, 447 (11th Cir.1996) 
D.C.  Undecided Taylor v. Rice, 451 F.3d 898, 905–06 
(D.C.Cir.2006) 
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to be proven by the employer as an affirmative defense to denying an 
employment opportunity to a disabled individual admittedly because of his 
or her disability. In direct-threat cases, employers are not arguing that they 
did not discriminate. Quite to the contrary, in the “direct-threat” paradigm, 
the whole case is founded upon the employer’s admission that it [a] did 
indeed discriminate and [b] discriminated because of the applicant’s or 
employee’s disability—coupled with the contention, solely within the 
employer’s province, that it was justified in discriminating because of the 
disability for the reason that the disability posed a direct threat. That is why 
the statute expressly places “direct threat” among the affirmative defenses.77 
The statute does not speak to prima facie cases or what their components 
might be. While the statute does talk of protecting “qualified individuals with 
disabilities who can perform essential job functions without or without 
accommodation,”78 that use of the word “qualified” does not in some 
talismanic way transform what the statute sets forth as a defense to be proven 
by admittedly discriminating employers into a new component of proving 
that one is a qualified individual with a disability, thereby being prima facie 
protected by the statute. That is enough for the Supreme Court to decide this 
issue in favor of the text and, therefore, in favor of requiring employers to 
prove up direct threats.79 
A second—and related—textualist point: the text of statutes with 
Congressional findings should be interpreted consistently with and informed 
by those findings. Eight of the nine Congressional findings that open the 
ADA of 1990 are rooted in the financial and economic disadvantaging that 
disabled individuals have suffered and continued to suffer.80 It would be 
nothing short of perverse for Congress to then have required that disabled 
individuals would have to muster the resources to enlist the finances and 
medical expertise to prove a negative—that they are not direct threats—as 
                                               
 77. American with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 103(a)–(b), 104 
Stat. 327, 333–34 (1990). 
 78. Id. at § 101(8), § 102(a). 
 79. The author’s views on this subject have evolved over the last twenty years, when he 
agreed more with Judge Edith Jones’ position articulated in her dissent from the Rizzo en banc 
opinion.   See Typhoid Mary, supra note 28, at 865 n. 64.   As for the textualist approach by 
which the author’s thinking evolved, it must be noted that while useful here, textualism, taken 
to an extreme, can pose problems for the implementation of employment discrimination laws. 
See Stephen R. Greenberger, Civil Rights and The Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 62 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 37, 53–54, 56–70 (1991); see, e.g. Kieber v. CareFusion Corp. 914 F.3d 480 
(7th Cir. 2019)(en banc), rev’g 888 F.3d 868 (7th Cir. 2018)(quickly becoming infamous for 
the en banc court’s view, reached using the tools of textualism, that  the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., does not permit outside job applicants to 
sue an employer under the ADEA for hiring practices that have a demonstrably disparate 
impact on applicants who are age 40 and over — a position rejected even by the likes of Judge 
Frank Easterbrook, who dissented). 
 80. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, §2 (a)(2)–(9), 104 
Stat. 327, 328–29 (1990). 
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the cover charge to seek relief under the ADA when they lack the very 
resources to do so.81 
II.  WHO IS THE DECIDER? AND WHAT, EXACTLY, IS THE DECIDER 
TO DECIDE? 
The greatest issues raised by the ADA’s “direct threat” standard are 
interconnected and sequential. First, who is the decider as to whether a 
particular disabled individual is lawfully excluded from employment because 
s/he poses a direct threat?82 Second, what exactly is the nature of the issue 
that the decider is to decide?83 At the time that the author wrote his Harvard 
Journal of Law and Public Policy study of the “direct-threat” standard, these 
issues had not been adequately identified, explored, and resolved in the case 
law. The purpose of this section is determine the extent to which, in the 
intervening 20 years, the federal courts have identified, explored, and 
resolved these two foundational issues. 
                                               
 81. A recent commentator who has argued for burdening the disabled individual with 
the direct-threat proof has swept past the textual, structural, purposeful, and legislative 
historical considerations and plunged into making ex cathedra policy declarations that defy 
the text, the structure, the Congressional findings and purpose, and the legislative history of 
the ADA: 
A better view is that safety is always paramount and thus an essential function 
of every job, and the burden of proof is always on the employee to show that 
he or she can safely perform the job. However, there can be a question as to the 
burden of production. The employer should first be required to produce 
credible evidence of a safety threat. Then, the worker will have the burden to 
rebut that evidence, and he or she will also carry the ultimate burden of 
persuasion. 
  
Lawrence P. Postol, ADA Open Issues: Transfers to Vacant Positions, Leaves of Absence, 
Telecommuting, and Other Accommodation Issues, 8 ELON L. REV. 61, 94 (2014). 
 82. See, e.g., Brian S. Prestes, Disciplining the Americans with Disabilities Act’s Direct 
Threat Defense, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 409, 410 (2001) (arguing that employers 
should make direct threat determinations with statistical guidance from the EEOC and OSHA 
and noting that “juries, left to their own devices and ambiguous statutory commands, are likely 
to produce inconsistent and inaccurate results”); Teresa L. Clark, A Map for the Labyrinth: 
How to Conduct Job Interviews and Obtain Medical Information Without Violating the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 13 LAB. LAW 121, 148 (1997) (recommending that direct 
threat determinations should be made by human resource officers, not interviewers or hiring 
managers). 
 83. See, e.g., Patrick J. Schwedler, Prescription Drugs and Dangerous Jobs: When Can 
Disclosure Be Required for Public Safety under the ADA?, 17 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 93, 
114–115 & n. 133, (noting that the EEOC uses direct threat analysis to make “public safety” 
exception determinations); Nathan J. Barber, “Upside Down and Backwards”: The ADA’s 
Direct Threat Defense and the Meaning of a Qualified Individual After Echazabal v. Chevron, 
23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 149, 184 (2002) (arguing in favor of “the common sense 
notion that an applicant who will be harmed by the work environment is not qualified for the 
position irrespective of whether or not the applicant poses a direct threat to himself”). 
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Based on the author’s law-practice, teaching, and scholarly 
experience with the ADA and “direct-threat” issues thereunder, he has 
identified five possible paradigms in which to consider the answer to the 
questions of “who decides and what do they decide”: 
 
 
 
The real interplay here are the role(s) that the employer, a medical 
consultant, a federal district judge, and a federal court jury are to play in 
terms of both “who decides” and “what is to be decided.” We will examine 
each. 
A. The Employer, In Good Faith 
1. Employer Prerogative—The Origins Of A Good-Faith Standard, 
Which Has For Over 40 Years Been The Foundation For Arguing 
That Certain Workplace Issues Remain Outside Of The Reach Of 
Federal Employment Discrimination Laws 
Since the earliest days of the Employment Discrimination Laws 
EDLs, employers have argued that they retain a large share of employer 
prerogative to make personnel decisions, a zone of privilege that employers 
insist is isolated from the reach of EDLs.84 “Although the change in the 
                                               
 84. The first time the term “prerogative” appears in the published federal cases in 
reference to a zone of employer discretion immune from the limitations of EDLs is, ironically, 
in a case in which the legendary Judge John R. Brown reversed a trial court judgment for 
General Motors in a case arising out of its Lakewood, Georgia assembly plant, where jobs had 
been segregated until 1962: 
Who’s the decider, and what does the decider decide?  OPTIONS: 
1. Employer, in good faith 
2. Employer, if employer can get a medical opinion (and 
“reasonably believes” that the individual poses a direct 
threat) 
3. Employer, if employer can get a medical opinion with 
which the jury agrees 
4. The jury gets to decide, considering evidence from both 
sides 
5. The decision should be made through a model of expert 
medical consultation 
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American workplace that would inevitably occur by eliminating race and sex 
discrimination must have been recognized as enormous even in 1964, 
proponents of the Civil Rights Act provided assurances that the traditional 
prerogatives of management would be left undisturbed to the greatest extent 
possible.”85 Many federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have bought 
into this vision.86 As Professor Cardi has explained: 
Just as it influenced the Court’s reasoning in Price 
Waterhouse, a concern for employer freedom—manifesting 
in the common-law, employment-at-will principle—plays a 
significant role in courts’ application of employment 
discrimination statutes.87 
In Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters,88 Justice Rehnquist famously 
wrote for a 7–2 majority that 
The dangers of embarking on a course such as that charted 
by the Court of Appeals here, where the court requires 
businesses to adopt what it perceives to be the ““best”“ 
hiring procedures, are nowhere more evident than in the 
record of this very case. Not only does the record not reveal 
that the court’s suggested hiring procedure would work 
satisfactorily, but also there is nothing in the record to 
indicate that it would be any less “haphazard, arbitrary, and 
subjective” than Furnco’s method, which the Court of 
                                               
Akin to this is the contention that “experience” was essential and only the long-
employed Whites–and conversely, not the recently hired Blacks–had the 
“experience”. Without gainsaying, as Griggs, supra, makes so plain, 
that qualifications are an employer’s prerogative, the standards cannot be 
automatically applied to freeze out newly freed Blacks because for the years of 
its segregated policy GM hired no Blacks to afford them an opportunity to 
acquire experience. And on this GM–apart from its incantation of “experience” 
needs–made no effort to show that in these ebb and flow lay-offs and rehirings, 
that none of the affected Blacks was job-disqualified. 
 
Rowe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 351, 358 (5th Cir. 1972) (citing Griggs Co. v. Duke 
Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971)) (original emphasis & emphasis added). 
 85. Martha Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality under Title VII: Disparate 
Impact Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L. REV. 305, 306, n. 7 
(1983) (citing H.R. REP. No. 914, at 29, reprinted in, EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES 
VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 2150). 
 86. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (“Title VII eliminates 
certain bases for distinguishing among employees while otherwise preserving employers’ 
freedom of choice. This balance between employee rights and employer prerogatives turns out 
to be decisive in the case before us.”). 
 87. W. Jonathan Cardi, The Role of Negligence Duty Analysis in Employment 
Discrimination Cases, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1129, 1140 (2014) (footnote omitted). 
 88. 438 U.S. 567 (1978). 
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Appeals criticized as deficient for exactly those reasons. 
Courts are generally less competent than employers to 
restructure business practices, and, unless mandated to do so 
by Congress, they should not attempt it.”89 
From this foundation evolved a series of cases that more and more 
gave rise to a palpable deference to employer “prerogatives” that, sub 
silentio, became counterweights which allowed courts to recharacterize an 
EDL plaintiff’s claim as one of disputing employer judgment rather than 
“true” discrimination. And since the EDLs did not require employers to 
exercise even good – let alone the best – judgment because of the scope of 
their prerogative, the fact that an employer had the facts wrong or 
investigated them ineptly before taking an adverse employment action was 
held as a matter of law to be beyond the reach of the EDLs.The 1980s 
produced some of the most-cited gems in this repertoire (especially by 
management-side lawyers in briefs supporting summary judgment motions 
and in proposed jury instructions). Some courts said: “It scarce need be said 
that Title VII is not a shield against harsh treatment at the workplace; it 
protects only in instances of harshness disparately distributed.”90 Other 
courts observed that “[a] court does not sit as a super-personnel department 
that reexamines an entity’s business decisions.”91 These thoughts morphed 
into a more general set of assertions that further expanded the widely-
enveloping area into which employer prerogative had expanded since 1964. 
“If you honestly explain the reasons behind your decision, but the decision 
was ill-informed or ill-considered, your explanation is not a ‘pretext,’” that 
doyen of law and economics and plain-spoken stylist, Judge Frank 
Easterbrook of the Federal Court in Chicago wrote. “A reason honestly 
described but poorly founded is not a pretext, as that term is used in the law 
of discrimination.”92 Not satisfied with the watering down of the whole 
notion of pretext from the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine formulation of the 
prima facie case, Judge Easterbrook elaborated in a call to arms for 
employers asserting their business prerogatives against what he plainly saw 
as economically indefensible incursions by federal EDLs, that “[a] district 
judge does not sit in a court of industrial relations. No matter how medieval 
                                               
 89. Id. at 578. 
 90. Jackson v. City of Killeen, 654 F.2d 1181, 1186 (1981) (reversing the trial judge’s 
finding of facts and resulting conclusions of law in favor of a Title VII plaintiff). After a full 
bench trial, the federal district judge had ruled that “Patricia Jackson, a black female with a 
bachelor’s degree in library science and two years of library experience in a junior high 
school” was discharged in violation of Title VII by the Killeen Public Library, and had ordered 
“her reinstated and awarded her $1,389 in back pay and $1,500 in attorneys’ fees.” Id. at 1182, 
1183. 
 91. Dale v. Chi. Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458, 464 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 92. Pollard v. Rea Wire Magnet Co., 824 F.2d 557, 558, 559 (7th Cir. 1987) (in the same 
vein, noting “[i]f the only question were whether Pollard was injured, we would accept the 
judge’s conclusion without hesitation. But no federal rule requires just cause for discharges.”). 
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a firm’s practices, no matter how high-handed its decisional process, no 
matter how mistaken the firm’s managers, Title VII and § 1981 do not 
interfere.”93 Somewhere in that great robing room in the sky, Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., must have nodded approvingly.94 
Perhaps among management-side lawyers writing defendants’ jury 
instructions in EDL cases, the most oft-cited synthesis of these ideas about 
employer prerogative came from Judge Edith Hollan Jones, who wrote in a 
case ironically finding a fact-issue for trial in an airline employee’s ADEA 
claim: 
[W]e do not hold that a verdict for Bienkowski would be 
supportable only on evidence that American’s reasons for 
firing him are not justified or supported by objective facts. 
The Supreme Court has cautioned that -- 
The fact that a court may think the employer misjudged the 
qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him 
to [employment discrimination] liability, although this may 
                                               
 93. Id. at 560. Judge Easterbrook prefaced the quoted language: 
In the end, the district judge believed that Rea was not well run (it had no 
written rules on absences, did not ask Pollard to bring in an excuse, and 
tolerated an inconsistency between the rule in the collective bargaining 
agreement that requires discharge for missing five days and a point system that 
does not) and as a result of a coincidence (Pollard’s request for leave the week 
of July 23) erred in not believing Pollard’s excuse. An arbitrator who came to 
these conclusions could order Pollard reinstated with back pay. A district judge 
does not sit in a court of industrial relations. 
 
Id. 
 94. Lamson v. Am. Axe & Tool Co., 58 N.E. 585 (Mass. 1900) (Holmes, C.J.). Of this 
case, another court wrote: 
[An] employs a servant to paint hatchets under a rack upon which they are 
placed to dry. During this employment this rack which safely held the hatchets 
is removed, and a new one is substituted for it which is dangerous because the 
jar sometimes dislodges the hatchets and causes them to fall upon the workman 
below. Nevertheless, the servant continues to paint beneath them. A hatchet 
falls upon and injures him. He cannot recover of his master for the injury, 
because he has voluntarily assumed the risk; and this is none the less true, says 
Mr. Justice Holmes, that fear of loss of his place induced him to stay. 
 
St. Louis Cordage Co. v. Miller, 126 F. 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1903) (citing Lamson); see ALBERT 
W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES 
128–130 (2000) (“Holmes’ appointment to the bench required him to confront the present – 
in particular, the working conditions of industrialized America. . . . [H]is opinions for the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reveal less about his theory of torts than about his 
tough-minded approach to human suffering and his failure to address ‘considerations of social 
advantage.’”). 
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be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretext 
for discrimination. 
The ADEA was not intended to be a vehicle for judicial second-
guessing of employment decisions, nor was it intended to transform the 
courts into personnel managers. The ADEA cannot protect older employees 
from erroneous or even arbitrary personnel decisions, but only from 
decisions which are unlawfully motivated.95 
Thus, as Professor Chambers has observed, 
[the] Court has gradually limited protections for employees 
under Title VII by providing employers increasing latitude 
to structure the workplace in ways that may facilitate 
discrimination. Title VII was designed to restrict the 
employer’s ability to discriminate but was not designed to 
completely eliminate employer autonomy. However, when 
employer autonomy intersects with or leads to 
discrimination, Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination 
ought to prevail. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has been 
subtly allowing employer prerogative to override 
employment discrimination statutes by allowing employers 
to structure their actions to avoid liability or by removing 
coverage for decisions that the Court believes ought to be 
within the employer’s discretion. This may affect how well 
Title VII meets its overarching objectives.96 
This is a persistent strain of judicial thought, a kind of 
accompaniment playing steadily in the background as federal courts make 
important decisions about what various EDL provisions mean and how they 
are to be implemented. At times, however, this (dis)harmony can crescendo 
to overwhelm the melody of a court’s decision, laying bare for all to see the 
continuing power that the employer prerogative’s idea carries. We see that in 
various ways in the Beverage Distributors97 and Michael98 cases discussed 
in Subsections II.B and II.C, infra. 
                                               
 95. Bienkowski v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1503, 1507–08 (5th Cir. 1988) (citations 
& footnote omitted). 
 96. Henry L. Chambers Jr., The Supreme Court Chipping Away at Title VII: 
Strengthening It or Killing It?, 74 LA. L. REV. 1161, 1166 (2014) (footnote omitted); see also 
Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Neoliberalism and the Lost Promise of Title VII, JOTWELL: 
WORKLAW (April 11, 2018), https://worklaw.jotwell.com/neoliberalism-and-the-lost-prom
ise-of-title-vii (reviewing Deborah Dinner, Beyond “Best Practices”: Employment-
Discrimination Law in the Neoliberal Era, 92 IND. L.J. 1059 (2017)). 
 97. EEOC v. Beverage Distrib. Co., LLC, 780 F.3d 1018, 1021–22 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 98. Michael v. City of Troy Police Dep’t, 808 F.3d 304, 307, 309 (6th Cir. 2015). 
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2. To Dream The Impossible Dream—Employers Arguing For The 
Direct-Threat Issue To Be Decided By Employers, Subject Only To A 
Requirement That They Decide “In Good Faith” Whether An Individual 
Poses A Direct Threat 
For some in the employer community, our inquiry should not 
proceed beyond this: 
 
 
 
But is any of this “employer prerogative” and “good-faith decisions” 
equated to “non-discriminatory decisions” appropriate to the ADA setting? 
Employers have gotten some traction with arguing prerogative as the genesis 
for at least some allocations of decision-making under the ADA. For 
example, since the early days after the Title I employment provisions of the 
ADA took effect, courts have consistently invoked employer prerogative in 
choosing among available “reasonable accommodations” that would permit 
an employee to perform the essential functions of a job.99 This statement has 
typically come up when the employee sought accommodation X but 
                                               
 99. See Jay v. Intermet Wagner Inc., 233 F.3d 1014, 1017 (7th Cir. 2000) (“It is 
the employer’s prerogative to choose a reasonable accommodation; an employer is not 
required to provide the particular accommodation that an employee requests.”). As one district 
court recently ruled, citing Jay, a 1973 Rehabilitation Act failure-to-accommodate case could 
not be resolved on summary judgment because the facts permitted two rational views of the 
evidence on the failure-to-accommodate issue raised by a pharmacy technician who had a 
permanently and seriously disabled right hand: 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Bredemeier, a reasonable 
jury could conclude that she needed the dictation software to perform her job 
duties in light of her disability and that the VA’s prolonged failure to get the 
dictation software up and running again despite repeated requests and 
numerous e-mails back and forth about the problem constitutes a failure to 
reasonably accommodate her disability. On the other hand, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the VA, a reasonable jury could also 
conclude that—dictation software problems aside—the VA reasonably 
accommodated Bredemeier by providing her with numerous other 
accommodations, including transitional duty assignments, a new 
ergonomically designed workstation, software training, and new headsets. 
 
Bredemeier v. Wilkie, No. 15 C 7514, 2018 WL 3707803, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 2018). 
Who’s the decider, and what does the decider decide?  OPTIONS: 
(1) Employer, in good faith 
*** 
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employer rejected that accommodation and offered only Accommodation 
Y.100 
However, fundamentally and functionally, the ADA is different. It 
requires a form of affirmative action – reasonable accommodation – which 
in and of itself is a substantial limitation on employer prerogative.101 As one 
experienced attorney in the field has written, “[t]he ADA is different from all 
other discrimination laws, since the other laws merely level the playing 
field,” which effectively allows employers to “put on blinders and treat all 
workers the same, irrespective of race, color, sex, age, etc.,” while “the ADA 
creates an affirmative duty for employers by requiring employers to provide 
reasonable accommodations, which can impose significant costs and burdens 
on employers.”102 
The “direct-threat” standard was a particularly distinguishing feature 
of the ADA. As Linda Hamilton Krieger has perceptively written about its 
pantheon in the EDL universe: 
The ADA and its implementing regulations had yet another 
remarkable feature: they limited an employer’’s prerogative 
to exclude a disabled person from a particular job based on 
a scientifically unsound assessment of the risks to health and 
safety posed by the person’’s disability. Under the new law, 
an employer could exclude a disabled individual from a 
particular job on safety grounds only if the person presented 
a “direct threat” to the health or safety of others in the 
workplace, as that term had been narrowly interpreted under 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.  Specifically, under the direct 
                                               
 100. See, e.g., Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542–43 (7th Cir. 
1995) (Posner, J.); Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis Without Analyzing Costs of 
Benefits: Reasonable Accommodation, Balancing, and Stigmatic Harms, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1895 (2007); Carrie Griffin Basas, Back Rooms, Board Rooms - Reasonable Accommodation 
and Resistance Under the ADA, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 59 (2008); but see Kauffman 
v. Peterson Healthcare VII, LLC, 769 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.) (while employer 
may get the ultimate choice, employer who offers essentially no choice created triable fact 
issue on plaintiff’s failure-to-accommodate claim). 
 101. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, §102(5)(A)–(B), 
104 Stat. 327, 332 (1990). 
 102. Postol, supra note 81, at 62. Mr. Postol goes on to observe about the “direct-threat” 
standard in particular: 
The issue of the safety of the employee and others, the “direct threat” defense, 
continues to be a difficult issue because it is so fact-specific and deals with 
medical issues for which there are not always easy and clear answers. Certainly 
courts are not as quick to say a disabled employee can perform the essential 
duties of his or her job when it exposes the worker or others to a risk of 
significant injury. But the courts cannot agree as to what medical evidence is 
required to determine if there is a safety risk and who bears the burden of proof. 
 
Id. at 64–65 (footnotes omitted). 
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threat defense an employer could exclude a disabled 
individual from a particular job only upon a “reasonable 
medical judgment that relies on the most current medical 
knowledge and/or the best available objective evidence,” 
taking into account the duration of the alleged risk, the 
nature and severity of the potential harm, and the imminence 
and actual likelihood of potential harm.  
Because stigmatizing conditions are so often associated with 
irrational perceptions of danger, and because risk 
assessment in any context is more often based on popular 
myths and stereotypes than on sound scientific analysis, the 
ADA’s direct threat defense was potentially transformative. 
No longer, it seemed, could a disabled person be excluded 
from a particular job because his or her presence was in good 
faith viewed as presenting an elevated health or safety 
risk. In making any such assessment, the ADA seemed to 
require that an employer replace an “intuitive” or “popular” 
approach to risk assessment with more scientific methods 
and standards.103 
But as a management-side employment lawyer representing airlines 
at the time the ADA’s Title I employment provisions took effect in 1992, it 
is the author’s view that Professor Kreiger’s description of the true nature of 
the direct-threat standard is too chaste, too restrained, and too murky. From 
where the author stood, the direct-threat standard was an affirmative defense 
that amounted to the same kind of defense that the defendant has to prove 
truth in a case of defamation. The defendant in both kinds of cases has the 
burden of proving truth.104 Not “a reasonable version of the truth.” No, 
absolute truth, in the eyes of the factfinder.105 And that is a mighty formidable 
burden. 
In its first rendezvous with the “direct-threat” standard after the 
Arline case, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected “good faith employer belief” as 
the governing standard for the decider and what is to be decided in ruling on 
the direct-threat defense under the ADA. The case was Abbott v. Bragdon, 
and it arose out of an asymptomatic, HIV-positive dental patient’s suit 
against a dentist who refused because of the patient’s HIV status to fill her 
cavity in his office and insisted on performing this routine procedure only in 
                                               
 103. Linda Hamilton Krieger, Foreword -- Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
1, 5–6 (2000) (footnotes omitted). 
 104. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A cmt. B (AM. LAW. INST. 1976) (“It 
has been consistently held that the truth is an affirmative defense which must be raised by the 
defendant and on which he has the burden of proof.”). 
 105. Id. 
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a hospital.106 Admitting that he had discriminated against the patient because 
of her disability, the dentist argued that he had determined, in good faith, that 
the risk that her HIV virus might be transmitted to him during the routine 
dental procedure was a direct threat to his health and safety that absolved him 
from liability under ADA Title II (public accommodations).107 In an opinion 
by Justice Kennedy, the Court rejected the dentist’s argument that his good 
faith fear for contracting HIV was a shield. A “belief that a significant risk 
existed, even if maintained in good faith, would not relieve” a discriminator 
from liability for excluding someone as a “direct threat.”108 Although not an 
ADA Title I employment case, Abbott v. Bragdon set the rule for Title I cases, 
too, since “direct-threat” concept is the same between the two Titles of the 
ADA. Amazingly, counsel for employers still on occasion will attempt to 
rescue their clients from the wages of inept, non-medically supported 
decision-making by reviving some variant of the very argument resoundingly 
rejected in Abbott v. Bragdon.109 
B. Employer, if Employer Can Get a Medical Opinion (and 
“Reasonably Believes” That the Individual Poses a Direct 
Threat) 
1. Employer Prerogative Clothed in the Language of Objectivity 
This is a curious category, and one the author might never have 
conceived on his own. But in response to a recent federal appeals court case, 
which otherwise defies description, this category suggested itself. For this is 
a position that is only slightly removed from the defer-to-my-good-faith-
belief stance that the U.S. Supreme Court rejected in Abbott v. Bragdon: 
 
                                               
 106. 524 U.S. 624, 628–29 (1998). 
 107. Id. at 648. 
 108. Id. at 649. 
 109. Stragapede v. City of Evanston, 865 F.3d 861, 867 (7th Cir. 2017) (“The City’s 
primary argument is that it does not matter whether Stragapede actually posed a direct threat 
to health or safety; it’s enough that the City thought he was a direct threat. The Supreme Court 
disagrees . . . Bragdon holds that an employer’s ‘belief that a significant risk existed, even if 
maintained in good faith, would not relieve him from liability.’ Rather, a ‘direct threat’ defense 
is based solely on ‘medical or other objective evidence.’”) (citations omitted). The Stragapede 
decision is discussed further infra at nn. 154–68 and accompanying text. 
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Generally, American lawyers and judges respond with an almost 
Pavlovian enthusiasm to standards and rules clothed with at least a patina of 
objectivity. And when one goes from “good-faith” to “reasonable” as the 
modifier for “belief,” many are the lawyers and judges who will conclude we 
have gone from lawless to orderly decision-making.110 But the semantical 
nuance does not necessarily create a practical difference in application. In the 
case of this standard, it stealthy accomplishes much of what Abbott v. 
Bragdon forbade. The best way in which to see that is to examine the recent, 
remarkable Tenth Circuit opinion in EEOC v. Beverage Distributors, which 
accomplishes its judicial sleight-of-hand in part through some unfortunate 
language included, with seeming carelessness, in Justice Kennedy’s Abbott 
v. Bragdon opinion!111 
2. EEOC v. Beverage Distributors: When Generalist Judges Don’t 
Discern Important Legal Distinctions 
In EEOC v. Beverage Distributors,112 the agency brought suit against 
a Colorado employer after it had conditionally hired but then dismissed a 
legally blind worker for the job of Night Loader in one of its beverage 
distribution warehouses.113 Before the Americans with Disabilities 
                                               
 110. See, e.g., Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in an EEO World, 89 IND. L.J. 115, 136 
(“When legal scholars have criticized retaliation law, they have mostly taken issue with the 
reasonable belief doctrine,” criticizing courts’ “narrow” view of reasonableness.); Matthew 
W. Green, Jr., What’s So Reasonable About Reasonableness: Rejecting a Case-Law Centered 
Approach to Title VII’s Reasonable Belief Doctrine, 62 U. Kan. L. Rev. 759, 761 (2013-2014) 
(noting that reasonable belief doctrine is “problematic to plaintiffs challenging discrimination” 
and that the Supreme Court “has failed to define the reasonable belief doctrine.”). 
 111. EEOC v. Beverage Distribs. Co., 780 F.3d 1018, 1021 (10th Cir. 2015) (“For this 
defense, Beverage Distributors had to show that it reasonably determined that Mr. Sungaila 
posed a direct threat.”) (relying on the “objective reasonableness” standard of Bragdon v. 
Abbot, 524 U.S. 624, 650 (Kennedy, J.), as construed in the Tenth Circuit by Jarvis v. Potter, 
500 F.3d 1113, 1122 (10th Cir. 2007)). 
 112. Id. at 1018. 
 113. EEOC v. Beverage Distribs. Co., No. 11-cv-02557-CMA-CBS, 2013 WL 6458735, 
at *1 (D. Colo. Dec. 9, 2013), rev’d in part, 780 F.3d 1018 (10th Cir.2015). 
Who’s the decider, and what does the decider decide?  
OPTIONS: 
(1) Employer, in good faith 
(2) Employer, if employer can get a medical opinion (and 
“reasonably believes” that the individual poses a direct 
threat) 
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Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA),114 the employer would likely have 
argued that the worker was not “disabled” because he was not excluded from 
a sufficiently broad class of jobs by his vision impairment.115 However, the 
ADAAA specifically targeted such narrowing interpretations by the U.S. 
Supreme Court and federal appeals courts for overruling.116 Thus, the 
employer could not defeat the case at the summary judgment stage, and was 
forced to try the case.117 Since the employer admitted disqualifying the 
worker based solely on his physical impairment, the employer was left to 
raise an affirmative defense to avoid liability.118 The employer did not raise 
a defense that the worker’s impairment could not be accommodated without 
undue hardship.119 Thus, the only affirmative defense left to the employer in 
the face of its admitted discrimination was to prove the “direct threat” 
defense.120 
The case was tried to a jury, which rejected the employer’s direct-
threat defense and awarded the worker over $132,000 in back pay.121 The 
court also ordered injunctive relief which included reinstatement with lost 
pay for the plaintiff and the retention of a consultant to assist the company in 
coming into legal compliance with the ADA, because, as the court noted, 
“[a]t trial, the testimony of Beverage Distributors managers and human 
resources professionals demonstrated a lack of sufficient knowledge about 
the ADA, its interactive process, and the requirement that reasonable 
accommodations be provided to employees” – as well as the fact that its 
“Employee Handbook contain[ed] an inaccurate statement of the law” to the 
effect it would provide reasonable accommodations, “unless doing so would 
                                               
 114. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). 
 115. E.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002); see generally 
Jeffrey A. Van Detta & Dan Gallipeau, Judges And Juries: Why Are So Many ADA Plaintiffs 
Losing Summary Judgment Motions And Would They Fare Better Before A Jury? A Response 
To Professor Colker, 19 REV. LITIG. 505 (2000) (With Dr. Dan Gallipeau)(ADA Symposium 
Issue). 
 116. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, §§ 2(a)(5)–(7), 2(b)(4)–(6), 4(1), 122 Stat. 3553-
3354, 3356. 
 117. Scholars have pointed out, however, that some employers and courts are shifting the 
old “summary judgment paradigm” from whether the worker has a “disability” “and onto the 
workplace itself . . . [b]y broadly defining a job’s essential functions—and by deferring to 
employers’ unsubstantiated characterizations of essential job function” which has the effect 
of “embedding able-bodied norms into the definition of work itself.” Michelle A. Travis, 
Disqualifying Universality Under the Americans With Disabilities Amendments Act, 2015 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1689, 1698 (2015). 
 118. EEOC v. Beverage Distribs. Co., 780 F.3d 1018, 1020, 1021 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 119. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2017). See Mark C. Weber, Unreasonable 
Accommodation and Due Hardship, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1119, 1122, 1135–42 (2010). 
 120. See Jarvis v. Potter, 500 F.3d 113, 1122 (10th Cir. 2007); see also EEOC v. 
Beverage Distribs. Co., 780 F.3d at 1020. 
 121. EEOC v. Beverage Distribs. Co., No. 11-cv-02557-CMA-CBS, 2013 WL 
6458735, at *1 (D. Colo. Dec. 9, 2013). 
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result in an undue hardship . . . or create the risk of harm to the health or 
safety of the applicant, associate, or others.” 122 
The employer appealed the liability verdict to the Tenth Circuit.123 
The employer hung its hat on an argument that the following unremarkable 
jury instruction was erroneous as a matter of law: 
To establish this defense, Beverage Distributors must prove 
both of the following by a preponderance of the evidence: 
1. Mr. Sungaila’’s employment in a Night Warehouse 
position posed a significant risk of substantial harm to the 
health or safety of Mr. Sungaila and/or other employees; and 
2.  Such a risk could not have been eliminated or 
reduced by reasonable accommodation.124 
In evaluating the employer’s argument, the Tenth Circuit panel 
staked out a position on the nature of the “direct threat” issue presented to 
the trier of fact that is inconsistent with the ADA and the origins of the “direct 
threat” standard in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Arline decision.125 
Concluding that “[t]he instruction did not accurately convey the direct-threat 
standard,” the panel offered the following ratiocination for its conclusion: 
The first part of the instruction required Beverage 
Distributors to prove more than what was legally necessary. 
According to the first part, Beverage Distributors had to 
prove that Mr. Sungaila posed a direct threat. That was not 
accurate under our case law. Beverage Distributors should 
have avoided liability if it had reasonably believed the job 
would entail a direct threat; proof of an actual threat should 
have been unnecessary.126 
The panel cited but one decision as “our case law”: 
                                               
 122. Id. at *8 (emphasis added). Of course, the Handbook should have stated that would 
provide reasonable accommodations, “unless doing so would result in an undue hardship . . . 
or create a significant risk of harm to the health or safety of the applicant, associate, or others, 
that cannot be eliminated through reasonable accommodation.” See id. (emphasis added). 
 123. See EEOC v. Beverage Distribs. Co., 780 F.3d at 1018. During the period pending 
appeal, the employer sought stay of the monetary judgment and instatement of plaintiff into 
his job, which was granted with the posting of a $132,000 supersedeas bond and stay of the 
district court’s order to hire a human-resources consultant to assist the employer with ADA-
compliance, which the district court denied. Id. 
 124. EEOC v. Beverage Distribs. Co., 780 F.3d at 1021. 
 125. Typhoid Mary, supra note 28, at 856–60 (referencing Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. 
Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
 126. EEOC v. Beverage Distribs. Co., 780 F.3d at 1022 (emphases added). 
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See Jarvis v. Potter, 500 F.3d 1113, 1122 (10th 
Cir.2007) (“[T]he fact-finder does not independently assess 
whether it believes that the employee posed a direct 
threat.”)127 
This changes the fundamental nature of the “direct-threat” defense 
from the employer having to martial the expert medical testimony necessary 
to prove that an employee or applicant in fact constitutes a direct threat – a 
truly objective inquiry—to a standard of what the employer “reasonably 
believes,” which makes the issue more about the employer and less about the 
science behind the determination. It comes, in fact, perilously close to an 
“honest belief” standard, which has been applied in other kinds of EDL cases 
in which employees discharged for work-rule violations who claim that they 
                                               
 127. Id. at 1021–22. The Jarvis court’s ratiocination is worth reading in the original: 
In evaluating an employer’s direct-threat contention, the fact-finder does not 
independently assess whether it believes that the employee posed a direct 
threat. Nor must it accept the contention just because the employer acted in 
good faith in deciding that the employee posed such a threat. As we 
understand Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 
(1998), the fact-finder’s role is to determine whether the employer’s decision 
was objectively reasonable. In Bragdon the defendant refused to provide dental 
care in his office to an HIV-positive patient. The patient alleged discrimination 
in violation of the ADA. After affirming the circuit court’s holding that HIV 
infection is a disability under the ADA, the Court considered whether the 
patient was entitled to summary judgment on the dentist’s contention that her 
HIV posed a direct threat to his health and safety. See id. at 648, 118 S.Ct. 
2196. The Court rejected the proposition that the dentist’s good-faith belief that 
she posed a direct threat relieved him of liability. See id. at 649, 118 S.Ct. 
2196. But it also ruled that the circuit court properly refused to consider 
evidence of safety that was not available to the dentist when he made his 
decision. See id. at 650, 118 S.Ct. 2196. The Court said that the proper test was 
the “objective reasonableness of the views” of the dentist. Id. We recognize 
that Bragdon was not an employment case. It was decided under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12182(b)(3), a provision of the ADA. But the Court explicitly pointed out 
that the ADA contains parallel language in its employment 
provisions, id. §§ 12111(3), 12113(b); see Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 648–
49, 118 S.Ct. 2196, and we see no reason not to apply Bragdon’s analysis to 
employment cases. 
Perhaps a more important difference between Bragdon and this case is that the 
defendant in Bragdon was a health-care professional, presumably a person 
better trained to assess dangerousness than a typical employer. Nevertheless, 
we believe that even nonexpert employers should be protected when they make 
objectively reasonable assessments, recognizing, of course, that objective 
reasonableness may well depend on whether professional advice is 
obtained. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (“This assessment shall be based on a 
reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical 
knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.” 
 
Jarvis v. Potter, 500 F.3d 1113, 1122–23 (10th Cir. 2007). 
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did not violate the rule and that the employer simply invoked the rule as a 
pretext for terminating them because of the employer’s bias against one or 
more of their protected characteristics. That line of cases—long and dubious 
in and of itself—is certainly not relevant to the hard science of determining 
whether an employee or applicant is a direct threat. 
The Beverage Distributors case did indeed elaborate on this theory 
of the direct-threat standard as an employer-focused rather than a science-
focused determination in litigation, hanging its hat on another Tenth Circuit 
panel’s interpretation in Jarvis v. Potter of the Supreme Court’s 1998 
decision in Abbott v. Bragdon.128 
But the passage of Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Abbot on which the 
Jarvis court relies does not actually set the standard for proving the direct-
threat defense as determining whether the employer “reasonably believed the 
job entailed a direct threat,” as the Beverage Distributors panel suggested. In 
fact, Justice Kennedy’s opinion opens the door to looking beyond whether 
there is a reasonable basis for the employer’s position to whether the 
employer’s position is actually reasonable.129 “In assessing the 
reasonableness of petitioner’s actions, the views of public health authorities, 
such as the U.S. Public Health Service, CDC, and the National Institutes of 
Health, are of special weight and authority,” Justice Kennedy wrote in that 
case where a dentist made a medical determination about whether treating a 
particular HIV-positive patient posed a “direct threat” to the dentist.130 
The trouble with the way that Jarvis, and then Beverage Distributors, 
uses Abbot may come from the passage in which Justice Kennedy goes onto 
suggest that “[t]he views of these organizations are not conclusive, however. 
A health care professional who disagrees with the prevailing medical 
consensus may refute it by citing a credible scientific basis for deviating from 
the accepted norm,” a proposition for which he cites the 1984 edition of a 
leading torts hornbook at the time.131 This is a particularly curious assertion 
and citation. First, how is the credibility of the “scientific basis for deviating 
from the accepted norm” to be assessed? Justice Kennedy did not explain 
this. But the citation to a torts hornbook is both more telling and more 
troubling. Justice Kennedy apparently sought to analogize the direct-threat 
determination to the very different question whether a physician being sued 
for medical malpractice acted within a range of acceptable practice that is 
epitomized in the customary standard of care applicable in such situations.132 
                                               
 128. See id.; Abbott v. Bragdon is discussed supra at nn. 106–08 and accompanying text. 
 129. Abbott v. Bragdon, 524 U.S. 624, 650–51 (1998). 
 130. Id. at 650. (citing Arline, 480 U.S. at 288; 28 CFR pt. 36, App. B, p. 626 (1997)). 
 131. Abbott v. Bradgon, 524 U.S. at 651 (“See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. 
OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS § 32, p. 187 (5th ed.1984)”). 
 132. See Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Dialogue With A Neurosurgeon: Towards A Dépeçage 
Approach To Achieve Tort Reform And Preserve Corrective Justice In Medical Malpractice 
Cases, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2009). As the author wrote about the virtually unique 
origin, role, and function of physician-established standards-of-care in medical malpractice 
cases: 
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Perhaps this analogy seemed apt in Abbot v. Bragdon, because the defendant 
was a dentist making a medical determination about whether he could safely 
treat a patient with HIV in his dental office.133 But it is not apt for 
extrapolation from that specific context and the specific kind of medical 
judgment at issue in Abbott. In fact, Justice Kennedy’s observations were 
made completely divorced from the direct threat standards provided in the 
statute and implementing regulation, which, as demonstrated in Section II.B, 
infra. That becomes obvious when one considers how the physician standard 
of care is defined: “[P]hysicians must exercise at least the skill, knowledge, 
and care normally possessed and exercised by other members of their 
profession in the same school of practice in the relevant medical 
community.”134 In actual practice, jury instructions on this standard further 
water it down by “add[ing] a good deal of rhetoric that repeatedly emphasizes 
instances of non-liability”135: 
For instance, the trial judge may well the jury . . . that the 
law presumes the physician exercised proper case. Other 
rhetorical instructions are commonly given. . . . For 
example, trial judges often see that the doctor-defendant is 
not required to exercise the highest degree of care, only the 
ordinary care of his profession; that the physician is not 
liable for a bad result or for a mistake where he acted in good 
faith; that medicine is an inexact science; or that the 
physician is not an insurer of the plaintiff’s health or a 
                                               
Principle seems utterly absent in the development of the standard of care. If 
anything, it appeared originally to be self-serving and political--a precise 
locality standard of care, which we may infer was the choice of early medical 
lobbyists because they knew that doctors in most communities, would be 
reluctant to provide testimony against colleagues. Even if they agreed to 
provide testimony, the insistence on expert testimony to establish a standard--
really, an industry custom-of care actually allowed the medical profession to 
set its own standards of negligence. In no other area of negligence is this the 
case. This very different standard allows what Learned Hand ruled in The T.J. 
Hooper would not occur in other areas of negligence law-reliance upon 
industry custom to set the standard of care without regard to whether that 
custom met an objective test of reasonableness, such as Judge Hand’s Carroll 
Towing formula. Thus, medical malpractice claims are part of a relatively small 
class of professional negligence claims that are adjudicated under a standard 
created by one’s own peers and not by the principles used in the rest of the tort 
system where the standard of reasonable behavior is that of a reasonable 
person. 
 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 133. 524 U.S. at 631. 
 134. DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN, & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, HORNBOOK ON TORTS, 
§ 21.5, at 504. (2d ed. 2016) (“The Traditional Medical Standard Of Care”) [hereinafter, 
“DOBBS ET AL., TORTS”]. 
 135. Id. 
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guarantor of her recovery. . . . . . . [Such instructions] 
inject[t] subjective, good faith issues into the objective 
negligence test and may lead the jury to think that bad faith, 
not departure from professional standards, is the test of 
liability.136 
This is hardly a permissible basis for the Court – in a moment of 
careless rhetoric not even at the heart of the issue the Court was charged with 
deciding in Abbott v. Bragdon137 – to add such a disruptive gloss to a clear 
statutory command that required no glossator’s hand to be implemented. 
Instead, this acorn of happenstance – which the author has found too often in 
Justice Kennedy’s opinions138 – was left to be nurtured into a mighty oak of 
misunderstanding by the federal appeals courts. 
In fact, whenever a court reaches for readily available principles or 
rules of tort law to “illuminate” EDL, the court does a disservice to both. As 
the author pointed out in a recent essay: 
The “tortification” of Title VII — a perhaps crude but 
evocative word that I choose here to never let us forget just 
how unwarranted and unnatural has been the raiment with 
which the 1991 CRA forcibly fitted Title VII — creates 
many disadvantages for the evolution of civil rights in our 
country, for the eradication of discrimination in our 
workplaces, and for the attainment of the amended Title 
VII’’s § 703(m) goals of lightening the terrifically difficult 
                                               
 136. Id. at 504–06. 
 137. Compare Justice Kennedy’s identification of the specific issues from the Certiorari 
Petition that the Court had agreed to decide in Abbott v. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 628 (“first, 
whether HIV infection is a disability under the ADA when the infection has not yet progressed 
to the so-called symptomatic phase; and, second, whether the Court of Appeals, in affirming 
a grant of summary judgment, cited sufficient material in the record to determine, as a matter 
of law, that respondent’s infections with HIV posed no direct threat to the health and safety of 
her treating dentist”). 
 138. And a trait noticed by others. See, e.g., Russell Shaw, The Incoherent, Dangerous 
Formulations of Justice Kennedy, THE CATHOLIC WORLD REPORT (June 15, 2015), 
https://www.catholicworldreport.com/2015/06/30/the-incoherent-dangerous-formulations-
of-justice-kennedy/. Indeed, one writer described Justice Kennedy as “a Cadillac’s intellect in 
a Lamborghini’s job. His writing ranged from needlessly flowery to completely 
incoherent.” Max Brantley, Don’t Cry For Justice Kennedy:  He Wasn’t All That, THINK
PROGRESS (June 27, 2018), https://thinkprogress.org/kennedy-was-a-bad-justice-76e464024
d78/. The same observer aptly noted, “[Mr. Justice] Kennedy could have been a perfectly 
adequate lower court judge, but he was in over his head at the Supreme Court. And, for that 
reason, his most celebrated opinions will be very easy to dismantle.” Id. Another decision that 
exemplifies this tendency towards incoherence – of leaving the law more confused than he 
found it – is J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011), in which he had the 
opportunity to resolve the issue of how and when the “stream of commerce” metaphor could 
be properly used in determining the constitutionality of a state court’s extra-territorial exercise 
of personal jurisdiction in a products liability case that was left in confusion after the Court’s 
decision in Asahi v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), yet utterly failed to do so. 
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burden of proof in these supposedly “post-racial” times. I 
myself argued in prior writings that Title VII is a statutory 
tort, but I did so in a metaphorical sense. My focus was on 
comparing the effect of a prima face case of tort to a prima 
facie case of discrimination under Title VII and the other 
EDL statutes. I certainly did not intend to suggest that the 
limiting doctrines on negligence invented by nineteenth and 
early twentieth century courts to protect business interests 
should be applied to Title VII. Yet, the Roberts-Retro 
Supreme Court has apparently espoused that view in its most 
unfortunate recent decision in Proctor v. Staub Hospital, 
where the Court purported to interpolate proximate 
causation doctrine from the common law of tort into the law 
of federal employment discrimination.139 
As the author observed in that essay, “[n]o one has better chronicled 
and exposed the ills of toritification” of the EDLs than Professor Sandra 
Sperino of the University of Cincinnati College of Law in “a series of well 
thought out, closely argued, and incontrovertibly reasoned publications” 
demonstrating the inherent inappropriateness of “the tort label.”140 As with 
the other EDLs, the “tort label” doesn’t work with the ADA, either. In fact, 
the ADA is not nearly as much about compensating injury as it is preventing 
injury. For example, as the preamble section of the ADA states, “the 
Nation’’s proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure 
equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic 
self-sufficiency for such individuals.”141 Of all the ADA’s goals, this one is 
the keystone.142 Thus, to treat the “direct threat” standard of the ADA as if it 
were properly descended from medical malpractice law is to miss the essence 
of the ADA. 
Like a stack of Jenga blocks from which one is removed at the 
base,143 the whole edifice of the Beverage Distributors approach to “direct 
threat” determinations comes tumbling down when you remove Justice 
Kennedy’s reliance on inapposite tort principles from the decision in Abbott 
                                               
 139. Jeffrey A. Van Detta, The Strange Career of Title VII’s § 703(m): An Essay on the 
Unfulfilled Promise of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 883, 897 (2015) 
(Symposium Issue: “Title VII at 50”)(footnotes omitted). 
 140. Id. (citing Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law, and 
Proximate Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2013); Sandra F. Sperino, Let’s Pretend 
Discrimination Is a Tort, 75 OHIO ST. L. J. 1107 (2014); Sandra F. Sperino, The Tort Label, 
66 FLA. L. REV. 1051 (2014)). 
 141. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7)(2016). 
 142. See S. REP. NO. 100-116, at 10 (1989) (“[T]he critical goal of [the Americans with 
Disabilities Act is] to allow individuals with disabilities to be part of the economic mainstream 
of our society.”) (emphasis added). 
 143. See Knowledge & Insights, The Jenga Metaphor, ENLIGHTENED BEYOND 
EXPECTATION (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.enlightened.com/insights/the-jenga-metaphor/ for 
an explanation of the Jenga metaphor. 
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v. Bragdon, and you then remove Abbot v. Bradgon as the authority for the 
Tenth Circuit’s holdings in Jarvis and Beverage Distributors. When the dust 
settles from overthrowing this erroneous precedent, where are we left? With 
a standard that cannot withstand serious scrutiny, and the need to keep 
searching for one that can. That is the subject of the remaining subsections 
in Section II. 
C. Employer, If Employer Can Get a Medical Opinion, With 
Which the Jury Agrees; The Jury Gets to Decide, Considering 
Evidence From Both Sides 
While conceptually separate, in practice, the next two options hug a 
fine line that might be illustrated this way – 
 
 
 
The fineness of this line, and a further complication in the line 
dividing them, is best understood by examining two recent federal appeals 
court cases that operate in a zone around that fine line. 
1. Dancing on the Side of Committing “Direct Threat” to Jury 
Determinations:  The Seventh Circuit in Stragapede v. City of 
Evanston, Illinois 
The Seventh Circuit’s position on the real question posed by the 
direct-threat defense – that “it is the employer’’s burden to show that an 
employee posed a direct threat to workplace safety that could not be 
eliminated by a reasonable accommodation” – provides a point of view 
seemingly at variance with the Tenth Circuit’s doctrine about what an 
employer is to prove in litigating the direct threat defense.144 Examination of 
one of the Seventh Circuit’s most recently decided ADA direct-threat-
defense cases confirms this dissonance. 
                                               
 144. Jay v. Intermet Wagner Inc., 233 F.3d 1014, 1017 (7th Cir. 2000). 
Who’s the decider, and what does the decider decide?  OPTIONS: 
*** 
(3) Employer, if employer can get a medical opinion with which the jury 
agrees 
── ── ── ── ── ── ── ── ─ A FINE LINE!─ — — — — 
 (4) The jury gets to decide, considering evidence from both sides 
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Stragapede v. City of Evanston, Illinois,145 addresses what, exactly, 
the employer must prove to make our the direct-threat defense under the 
ADA. Plaintiff Stragapede had been employed with a municipal water 
department for 14 years when he suffered an accident in the home that caused 
a traumatic brain injury.146 After a leave for treatment and recuperation, 
Stragapede sought to return to work, and after a three-day trial of his abilities 
to do his job, he was cleared by the municipality’s consulting physician and 
the municipality to resume his job with the benefit of reasonable 
accommodations: 
In anticipation of Stragapede’’s return to work, the City 
made two accommodations for him: He was permitted to be 
off-task to consult with his supervisors if he had any 
questions, and he could use a map, pen and paper, and a tape 
recorder as needed to perform his duties. From June 7 until 
June 22, Stragapede appeared to do his job without much 
trouble. 
Beginning on Wednesday, June 23, however, the City 
noticed some worrisome developments that continued over 
the following week. On that day Stragapede requested 
assistance to change out a water meter. The next day a city 
employee observed Stragapede driving through an 
intersection while looking down at his lap; the light was 
green, no pedestrians were present, and his momentary 
inattention did not result in an accident. On Friday 
Stragapede spent two hours at a job site installing a meter 
but was unable to complete the task. The following Monday 
Stragapede mistakenly went to the wrong location—Green 
Bay Road rather than Gross Point Road—for a “JULIE 
locate,” which involves locating and marking obscured 
water mains and sewer lines. On Wednesday Stragapede had 
another directional mishap, arriving at Colfax Place instead 
of Colfax Street for a water turn-on. Finally, on Thursday, 
July 1, Stragapede tripped on a set of steps and hurt his 
toes.147 
At that point, the municipality decided to put Stragapede on leave 
while it further consulted with its consulting physician about whether he 
should be allowed to continue working.148 The physician reviewed the reports 
of these incidents and opined that Stragapede was unable to perform the 
                                               
 145. 865 F.3d 861 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 146. Id. at 863. 
 147. Id. at 864–65. 
 148. Id. at 865. 
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essential functions of his job and therefore could be fired, which the 
municipality promptly did.149 
Unlike so many ADA plaintiffs,150 Stragapede located a Chicago 
lawyer151 conversant with the ways of the ADA. She sued the municipality, 
avoided summary judgment, and took the case to trial before a jury – which 
resulted in a very expensive series of days in federal district court for the 
municipality: 
On March 13, 2015, after a week-long trial, the jury returned 
a verdict for Plaintiff Biagio “Gino” Stragapede, finding that 
Defendant City of Evanston (the City) fired him on the basis 
of his disability in violation of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act. The jury also awarded Stragapede $225,000 
in compensatory damages for past and future emotional pain 
and suffering. The issue of equitable remedies—front pay 
and back pay—was reserved for this Court, which later held 
that Stragapede was entitled to $354,070.72 in back pay plus 
post-judgment interest, but no front pay.152 
At trial, the municipality had argued that Stragapede was not 
qualified to continue in his employment because he posed a “direct threat” to 
himself and others.153 However, its anecdotal evidence about his mishaps was 
not sufficient to meet the direct-threat burden; and its consulting physician 
contributed little to the defense, as noted by U.S. District Judge Edmond 
Chang in denying the municipality’s panoply of post-trial motions: 
Lastly, the City relies again on Dr. Grujic’’s testimony in an 
effort to prove that Stragapede was a safety risk, but the City 
identifies no specific testimony about safety. In fact, in 
response to the question, “You do not have any opinion 
based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty as to 
whether Mr. Stragapede’’s brain injury caused him to have 
safety issues on the job; is that correct?”, Dr. Grujic replied: 
“I don’’t know, since I’m not sure of their inner workings of 
the Water Department. I’’m not sure what all the safety 
issues that are involved there.” Flat out, Dr. Grujic did not 
formulate a medical opinion about Stragapede posing a 
                                               
 149. Id. 
 150.  Van Detta & Gallipeau, supra note 115. 
 151. As revealed in the District Court’s opinion, Stragapede v. City of Evanston, No. 12 
C 08879, 2016 WL 278854 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 2016), plaintiff’s attorney was Tracey E. 
Stevenson, then a shareholder of Robbins Solomon & Platt, Ltd, http://www.rsplaw.com/, 
who subsequently opened her own boutique law firm. See http://www.tracystevensonlaw.co
m; see also https://www.iadtc.org/members/?id=20404581. 
 152. Stragapede, 2016 WL 278854, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 2016). 
 153. Id. at *4. 
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safety risk. The City focuses on Dr. Grujic’s September 9 
letter, the one in which he opined that Stragapede could not 
perform the essential functions of his job (though the 
opinion was based only on the facts the City presented to the 
doctor). But . . . . . . there was ample evidence to support the 
jury’s finding that Stragapede could adequately perform his 
job, and thus infer from that evidence that he could also do 
his job safely.154 
On appeal, the municipality renewed its direct threat contentions.155 
The headnote writer at West Publishing summarized this section of the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision as “Issue of whether city employee’’s traumatic 
brain injury posed significant risk to health or safety, within meaning of 
ADA’’s direct threat defense, was for the jury in employee’’s claim of 
discrimination under the ADA.”156 While the panel did not employ those 
exact words, the panel’s discussion of the direct-threat defense is, indeed, 
fairly summarized in that sentence: 
The medical and objective evidence here was mixed. To 
support the defense, the City relied on testimony from 
Stragapede’’s supervisor, the incident in which Stragapede 
took his eyes off the road while driving through an 
intersection, the incidents in which Stragapede mistakenly 
reported to the wrong location, and Dr. Grujic’’s opinion. 
The jury was free to discount this evidence or to treat it as 
insufficient to support an inference that Stragapede posed an 
actual threat to his own safety or the safety of others. 
Stragapede testified in general terms that he followed safety 
protocols. He also testified that the intersection incident 
occurred only because he was reaching to grab a clipboard 
that had bounced off the seat and fallen. He noted, moreover, 
that the light was green and no pedestrians were present. 
Reasonable jurors could accept this explanation and reject 
the City’’s argument that the incident supports an inference 
that Stragapede was a safety threat. The jury also might 
reasonably have concluded that the two directional mishaps 
were not a safety issue at all. Lastly, as we’’ve noted, the 
jury was free to discount Dr. Grujic’s July and September 
opinions, which relied entirely on the City’’s 
characterization of Stragapede’’s performance. 
                                               
 154. Id. at *5. 
 155. Stragapede, 865 F.2d at 864. 
 156. Id. at 862 (Headnote 10). 
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We take the City at its word that “not just anyone” can do 
Stragapede’’s job. But the more focused inquiry is whether Stragapede could 
do it without significant risk to health or safety. It was reasonable for the jury 
to conclude that he could.157 
The Seventh Circuit’s approach here certainly seems in better 
harmony with the ADA direct-threat provisions and the EEOC’s 
implementing regulation.158 There is no element of deference here as there 
was in the Tenth Circuit decisions in Beverage Distributors and Jarvis.159 
But while closer to the statutory mark, does the approach epitomized by 
Stragapede really make sense for ADA “direct-threat” litigation in the long 
run? 
2. Dancing on the Side of Having Judges Take the “Direct Threat” 
Determination Away From Juries:  The Sixth Circuit in Michael v. 
City of Troy Police Department 
Judge Raymond Kethledge – an oft-mentioned, short-listed nominee 
for the U.S. Supreme Court since 2016160 – writing the majority opinion for 
his Sixth Circuit U.S. Appeals Court panel has an answer for the kind of 
problem posed by the approach that Stragapede epitomizes. Judge Kethledge 
is laboring against the cold wind of letting juries second-guess medical 
opinions, which may be just about as undesirable as wholesale deference to 
either the employer’s view (the good-faith standard rejected in Abbott v. 
Bragdon) or to the employer’s “reasonable” reliance on its ability to find a 
doctor who will support the employer’s view (the upshot of the Tenth 
Circuit’s reversal in Beverage Distributors of a trial court jury instruction 
that had articulated a position close to that the Seventh Circuit took in 
Straegepde).161 Judge Kethledge’s approach, however, is not to conclude that 
                                               
 157. Id. at 867. 
 158. As practitioners specializing in ADA advice and litigation have noted. See, e.g., 
William Brian London, Make Sure You’re On Target When Using Direct Threat Defense, 
FISHER PHILLIPS (Oct, 2 2017), available at https://www.fisherphillips.com/pp/newsletterarti
cle-using-direct-threat-defense.pdf?67595. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Dara Lind & Dylan Matthews, Your Guide To President Donald Trump’s Supreme 
Court Shortlist, VOX (May 19, 2016), https://www.vox.com/2016/5/18/11703416/trump-
supreme-court-shortlist (describing Judge Kethledge as “appear[ing] to be the kind of judge 
who very much enjoys telling people why they’re wrong.”); Elizabeth Slattery & John 
Malcolm, Courts Meet the 6 Stellar Judges Leading the Pack on Trump’s Supreme Court 
Short List Heritage Foundation Commentary—Courts, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (July 3, 
2018) https://www.heritage.org/courts/commentary/meet-the-6-stellar-judges-leading-the-pa
ck-trumps-supreme-court-short-list (noting his varied professional experience, including 
clerking for Sixth Circuit Judge Ralph Guy and U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, and noting his memorable admonition to the bar in a 6th Circuit opinion that 
““[t]here are good reasons not to call an opponent’s argument ‘ridiculous,’ . . . includ[ing] 
civility . . . . [b]ut here the biggest reason is more simple: the argument that State Farm derided 
as ridiculous is instead correct.”). 
 161. Lind & Matthews, supra note 160; Slattery & Malcolm, supra note 160 
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perhaps there’s something more deeply flawed with the way courts have been 
approaching the “who decides and what does the decider decide” questions 
that suggests that another analytic model outside of the judge-jury-trial 
process might be in order for meaningfully answering those questions.162 
Instead, Judge Kethledge’s solution is to use existing litigation structures to 
commit to trial judges the authority to make quite a few “direct-threat” calls 
as a matter of law – and in favor of employers.163 The case at hand is Michael 
v. City of Troy Police Department,164 and Judge Kethledge’s approach might 
be illustrated as follows — 
 
 
 
In Michael, the disabled individual was a police officer who was 
placed on extended unpaid leave.165 In the appeals court’s recounting of the 
tale, “[t]he City did so for two reasons: first, Michael had engaged in a two-
year pattern of aberrant behavior from 2007–09; and second, after Michael 
underwent brain surgery in 2009, two doctors concluded in detailed reports 
that Michael could not safely perform the functions of a patrol officer.”166 
The origins of the plaintiff’s medical troubles lay in a brain tumor, which 
took multiple surgeries to remove and which left residual neurological 
complications.167 Two years of obsessive behavior to regain possession of 
some steroid vials his wife had given plaintiff’s boss out of concern for 
plaintiff’s well-being raised the antennae of the police department.168 After 
he underwent a third brain surgery, the city’s police department declined to 
return the plaintiff to work unless and until he passed a medical examination, 
and plaintiff was referred to a neuropsychologist for that purpose.169 This was 
the first in a series of consultations and referrals, some initiated by the city, 
some initiated by the individual; what resulted was a fairly unstructured 
process that produced medical opinions from six doctors and a tangled 
conflict in the conclusions reached in those opinions: 
                                               
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. 808 F.3d 304, 307, 309 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 165. Id. at 305. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 306. 
 168. Id.  
 169. Id.  
Who’s the decider, and what does the decider decide?   OPTIONS: 
***(3) Employer, if employer can get a medical opinion with which 
the jury agrees 
 ── ── ── ── ── ── ── ─ A FINE LINE!──RULE 56 SPOILER! 
 (4) The jury gets to decide, considering evidence from both sides 
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To that end, the City referred Michael to a 
neuropsychologist, Dr. Firoza Van Horn. She interviewed 
and tested Michael for seven hours in her office, and then 
drafted a detailed report in which she ultimately concluded 
that Michael “may be a threat to himself and others.” Based 
on Van Horn’’s report, the City placed Michael on unpaid 
leave. Michael then sought a second opinion from Dr. Philip 
Leithen, another neuropsychologist, who interviewed 
Michael and pronounced him fit for duty. The City then sent 
Michael to another neuropsychologist, Dr. Bradley Sewick, 
who examined Michael in his office and wrote a detailed 
report that reached the same conclusion that Dr. Van Horn 
had reached. Two other doctors who reviewed Michael’’s 
file (but did not examine him) at the request of Michael’’s 
disability-insurance company, on the other hand, concluded 
that he could return to work. Finally, again on his own 
initiative, Michael saw Dr. Linas Bieliauskas, a professor of 
neuropsychology at the University of Michigan. After 
interviewing Michael and performing tests, Dr. Bieliauskas 
concluded that Michael has weak “executive functioning,” 
that “I cannot recommend that the patient return to full patrol 
duties[,]” and that “[s]afety with use of weapons and high-
speed driving would be in question.”170 
In the sum total of this fog of medical pronouncements, the city 
police department opted not to return plaintiff to work.171 Unhelpfully for 
plaintiff, he kept the last medical opinion that he’d sought out – that of Dr. 
Bieliauskas that was unfavorable to his quest to return to work — concealed 
unto himself.172 
In addressing the “who decides and what does the decider decide” 
question, Judge Kethledge unhesitatingly struck out on a path different in 
important nuance from the neighboring Seventh Circuit’s: 
Reasonable doctors of course can disagree—as they disagree 
here—as to whether a particular employee can safely 
perform the functions of his job. That is why the law requires 
only that the employer rely on an “objectively reasonable” 
opinion, rather than an opinion that is correct. Indeed, in 
many cases, the question whether one doctor is right that an 
employee can safely perform his job functions, or another 
doctor is right that the employee cannot, will be 
                                               
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 309. 
190 BELMONT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:2: 147 
unknowable—unless the employer runs the very risk that the 
law seeks to prevent.173 
Judge Kethledge further elaborated that the “objectively reasonable” 
standards requires very little from the employer other than selecting the 
“right” medical expert to opine: “An employer’’s determination that a person 
cannot safely perform his job functions is objectively reasonable when the 
employer relies upon a medical opinion that is itself objectively 
reasonable.”174 
But Judge Kethledge was not done fashioning a distinctive “who 
decides and what does the decider decide” standard for the Sixth Circuit. In 
further enlarging the significant zone of employer prerogative and District 
Judge control over the “direct threat” issue, he declared that medical evidence 
was not required to prove a direct threat and that, indeed, non-medical, 
anecdotal evidence, such as that of an employee’s erratic behavior in the 
workplace, was – if the District Judge found it “objective” – sufficient to 
establish that the employee indeed poses “a direct threat”, and likely 
sufficient to do so as a matter of law: “An employer need not rely on a 
medical opinion, however, to determine that a person poses a direct threat. 
Rather, ‘testimonial evidence’ concerning the employee’’s behavior “can 
provide sufficient support for a direct threat finding.”175 
The author has written elsewhere, and extensively, about the 
distorting effect and vitiating impact the aggressive use of the Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56 summary judgment device has wreaked upon the EDLs.176 The solution 
offered here is not the one that the statute or the regulations have in mind. It 
is a procedural and semantic slight-of-hand, executed with brilliant subtlety, 
that seeks to avoid the unthinkable – allowing juries to decide the complex 
issues limned in Arline in a context in which a jury determination was not at 
all part of the equation – through the use of procedural devices that simply 
allow a judge to say, in effect, “well, the employer just did what the doctor 
told him in excluding you from employment.”177 Direct threats are about 
science and scientific objectivity, not about empowering federal judges to 
                                               
 173. Id.  
 174. Id.  
 175. Id. (quoting Darnell v. Thermafiber, Inc., 417 F.3d 657, 660 (7th Cir. 2005)). 
 176. See Van Detta & Gallipeau, supra note 115; Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “Le Roi est Mort; 
Vive le Roi!”: An Essay On The Quiet Demise Of McDonnell Douglas And The 
Transformation Of Every Title VII Case After Desert Hotels v. Costa Into A “Mixed-Motives” 
Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71 (2003)[hereinafter “Le Roi”]; Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “Le Roi Est 
Mort” Redux: Section 703(m), Costa, McDonnell Douglas, and the Title VII Revolution, and 
a Reply To Hedican, Hudson, and Hedican, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 427 (2004)[hereinafter “Le Roi 
Est Mort”]; Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Requiem For A Heavyweight: Costa As Countermonument 
To McDonnell Douglas—A Countermemory Reply To Instrumentalism, 67 ALB. L. REV. 965 
(2004) [hereinafter “Requiem For A Heavyweight”]; Van Detta, supra note 149. 
 177. See Van Detta & Gallipeau, supra note 115; Le Roi, supra note 176; Le Roi Est 
Mort, supra note 176; Requiem For A Heavyweight, supra note 176; Van Detta, supra note 
149. 
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protect employers from themselves.178 While Judge Kethledge is surely 
correct that we do not want employers to “run the very risk that the law seeks 
to prevent,” the law is not simply a “safety-first” regulator.179 The ADA takes 
strong account of the individual’s right to be employed free of bias, fear, 
prejudice, and ignorance against the individual’s disability and its 
implications.180 The delicate balance between public and individual rights is 
best served by putting the best medical minds to work on the problem of 
“direct threat” – rather than making it ride on whether and how well an 
employer shops for a doctor. As Senior Circuit Judge Ronald Lee Gilman 
warned in his dissent, 
[T]here must come a point where a medical opinion ceases 
to be objectively reasonable. A contrary rule would allow an 
employer to avoid liability for an adverse employment 
action simply by seeking the opinion of a doctor known to 
consistently favor the employer. This expedient would strip 
employees of the protections that the ADA was intended to 
provide, and it accordingly cannot be the law.181 
Fortunately, there is a better solution – one that comes from the 
railroad and airline experience with tripartite medical review panels under 
the Railway Labor Act. That solution is discussed, infra. 
D. The Decision Should be Made Through a Model of Expert 
Medical Consultation 
As the author proposed in 1999182 and sets about here to update and 
revitalize in light of 20 years’ worth of ADA litigation, the best answer to the 
question “who is the decider and what does the decider decide” is provided 
by expert medical consultation as realized in a tripartite medical review 
process. 
 
                                               
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Michael v. City of Troy Police Dep’t, 808 F.3d 304, 315 (6th Cir. 2015) (Gilman, 
J., dissenting). Judge Gilman is about as down-to-earth a federal appeals court judge as one 
can ever hope to find, despite degrees from MIT and Harvard. See Ronald Lee Gilman, My 
Rookie Year On The Federal Bench, 60 OHIO ST. L. J. 1085 (1999). 
 182. Typhoid Mary, supra note 28. 
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In the succeeding subsections of Section II.D, the author will defend 
this thesis by (1) examining the relevant statutory and regulatory texts, (2) 
examining the problematic nature of jury determination of the medical issues 
at the heart of the direct-threat standard, (3) zeroing in on how the American 
experience with employee medico-safety issues under Railway Labor Act in 
the railroad and airline industries provides the key to proper implementation 
of the ADA’s direct-threat standard. 
1. The EEOC’s Direct-Threat Regulation and the Statutory Text It 
Implements:  Textualism That Brings Clarity 
In their now-classic text on interpreting statutes, the late Justice 
Scalia and Professor Bryan Garner remind us of two sound principles of 
interpretation that are particular applicable to understanding the foundational 
texts articulating the direct-threat standard. First, the “supremacy-of-text” 
principle states that “[t]he words of a governing text are of paramount 
concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text means.”183 
Second, the canon casus omissus pro omisso habendus est instructs us that 
“[n]othing is to be added to what the text states or reasonably implies.”184 
The EEOC’s regulation concerning the definition of “direct threat” 
provides – 
                                               
 183. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 56–68 (2012). 
 184. Id. at 93–100. 
Who’s the decider, and what does the decider decide?  
OPTIONS: 
1. Employer, in good faith 
2. Employer, if employer can get a medical opinion (and 
“reasonably believes” that the individual poses a direct 
threat) 
3. Employer, if employer can get a medical opinion with 
which the jury agrees 
4. The jury gets to decide, considering evidence from both 
sides 
5. The decision should be made through a model of 
expert medical consultation 
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(r) Direct Threat means a significant risk of substantial harm 
to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot 
be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation. 
The determination that an individual poses a “direct 
threat” shall be based on an individualized assessment of 
the individual’s present ability to safely perform the 
essential functions of the job. This assessment shall be 
based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on 
the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best 
available objective evidence. In determining whether an 
individual would pose a direct threat, the factors to be 
considered include: 
(1) The duration of the risk; 
(2) The nature and severity of the potential harm; 
(3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and 
(4) The imminence of the potential harm.185 
What this regulation does not say is who makes the “determination” 
that an employee or applicant poses a direct threat, or who makes the 
individualized assessment of the threat. Some courts, such as the Tenth 
Circuit in Beverage Distributors and Jarvis, assert that this is the employer’s 
determination to make, and that the statute and the regulations create a range 
of “reasonableness.”186 Thus, such courts would say that if the employer’s 
determination that an employee poses a “direct threat” falls within that range 
of reasonableness, then the fact-finder in an ADA suit must defer to it.187 
But this interpretation runs roughshod over other specific language 
in the regulation that shows that it is not quite so simple or deferential. The 
“individualized assessment,” we are told, shall be based on a “reasonable 
medical judgment.”188 Medical judgments are rarely within the wheelhouse 
of most employers. Further, the medical judgment to be used is not that of 
“the average, competent” physician, as we frequently see juries instructed in 
medical malpractice cases. To the contrary, a medical judgment is only 
“reasonable” for purposes of the statute and regulation if it meets two criteria: 
                                               
 185. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2012). 
 186. See EEOC v. Beverage Distribs. Co., LLC, 780 F.3d 1018, 1021–22 (10th Cir. 
2015); see also Jarvis v. Potter, 500 F.3d 1113, 1122 (10th Cir.2007). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
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1.  The medical judgment relies on the most current 
medical knowledge; and 
2.  The medical judgment relies on the best available 
objective evidence.189 
So, to say, as did the Tenth Circuit, that an employer “should have 
avoided liability if it had reasonably believed the job would entail a direct 
threat; proof of an actual threat should have been unnecessary” flies in the 
face of these twin commands.190 The medical judgment on which the 
employer relies must not be merely “reasonable” or within some range of 
“reasonableness.” Instead, the most current medical knowledge must support 
the medical judgment, and the best available objective evidence must be the 
foundation of that medical judgment.191 This demands actual, factual 
accuracy – not mere “reasonableness” from the employer’s perspective or 
one physician’s perspective.192 From these observations, it is evident that the 
District Court in Beverage Distributors correctly instructed the jury the 
employer must prove that a particular individual’s employment “posed a 
significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety” of either the 
individual or of others and that there was no reasonable accommodation to 
reduce or eliminate that risk. 
The jury is being asked to decide is not whether the employer acted 
reasonably, but whether the employer actually relied upon the judgment of 
medical experts and, if so, whether the experts’’ judgment was (1) 
individualized, (2) based on the most current medical knowledge, and (3) 
based on the best available objective evidence.193 If a medical judgment has 
these three qualities, it is not merely reasonable; it is optimized. This is 
tantamount to saying that the medical judgment both [a] established the 
existence of an actual threat and [b] was correct – for what else is a judgment 
that relies on the most current medical knowledge and the best available 
medical evidence? 
Indeed, the statute does not support any other intelligible reading. 
The ADA mentions “direct threat” in its definition section not as a product 
of the employer’s “reasonable belief,” but rather, as a factual absolute: “The 
term “direct threat” means a significant risk to the health or safety of others 
that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation.”194 
Note that the term is not defined, “‘direct threat’ means the 
employer’s reasonable belief, based on medical evidence, that an individual 
employee or applicant poses a significant risk to the health or safety of others 
                                               
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. EEOC v. Beverage Distribs. Co., LLC, 780 F.3d 1018, 1021–22 (10th Cir.2015). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3)(2012). 
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that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation.’”195 Similarly, the 
statute delineates the direct-threat defense itself in a consistent manner:  “The 
term ‘qualification standards’ may include a requirement that an individual 
shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the 
workplace.”196 
The language here is tellingly consonant with the statutory definition 
of direct threat. It clearly allows the employer to require that—as a matter of 
medical, scientific fact—an individual shall not pose a direct threat. “Shall” 
is not the language of discretion, the language evoking ranges of 
reasonableness, the language allowing an employer to use “a” medical 
opinion as a shield. Shall – a powerful intransitive verb – requires an absolute 
state of objective fact. It is not enough for an employer to hold “a reasonable 
belief” that employee poses a direct threat, even when that employee 
“reasonably relies” on a medical opinion. That employer must be able to 
prove – using that medical opinion – that the individual in fact poses a direct 
threat. Otherwise, the “direct-threat” standard will quickly do much to 
promote “doctor-shopping” and much less to promote the “health and safety” 
of the disabled individual or other people in his work environs. 
The question here can be analogized to the criminal law concepts 
that distinguish between the grounds for allowing police to stop an individual 
and interrogate – reasonable suspicion; the grounds for granting police a 
search warrant – probable cause; and the grounds for sustaining a criminal 
conviction – proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Certainly “reasonable beliefs” 
of an employer regarding potential safety risks that an employee’s medical 
condition might create will open the door for an employer to make medical 
inquiries that normally cannot be made under the ADA.197 If those inquiries 
yield objective evidence that sustains an employer’s reasonable belief about 
the threat, the employer may require the employee to submit to medical tests 
otherwise prohibited by the ADA.198 But only if the employee actually, 
factually poses a direct threat can the employer deny an otherwise qualified 
individual with a disability the statutorily guaranteed right to work.199 The 
burden is not simply for an employer to show it “reasonably believed” the 
employee posed a direct threat; as the Seventh Circuit has said in a number 
of cases, “it is the employer’s burden to show that an employee posed a direct 
threat to workplace safety that could not be eliminated by a reasonable 
accommodation.”200 
                                               
 195. Id. 
 196. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b)(2012). 
 197. See, e.g., U.S. Equal Employment Opp. Comm’n, Questions & Answers about 
Diabetes in the Workplace and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), ¶¶ 6, 7. 
 198. Id. ¶17 
 199. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r), app. at 356 (1999); see also EEOC Technical Assistance 
Manual on the ADA § 8.7, 
 200. Branham v. Snow, 392 F.3d 896, 906 (7th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). 
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2. Why Approaches to the Direct-Threat Defense That Leave It to 
Juries to Determine What a “Direct Threat to Health or Safety” Is 
in Any Given Situation Poses Its Own Special Kind of 
Perniciousness 
While there is much to be said for the Seventh Circuit’s approach in 
Stragapede as opposed to the Tenth Circuit’s approach in Beverage 
Distributors and Jarvis (and much to be said against the kind of approach 
proffered by the Sixth Circuit in Michael), the author remains firm in the 
conviction he reached in 1999 – after litigating ADA cases since the effective 
date of the Act’s employment provisions in 1992 – that committing the 
“direct-threat” determination to juries, while certainly better than simply 
deferring to an employer’s “objective belief” on the question (or, as surrogate 
for that, having judges defer to employer’s reliance on “a” medical opinion), 
leaves such to be desired.201 There are a number of reasons that lead 
inescapably to this conclusion: 
                                               
 201. Little has improved from the assessment that the author made of the extant cases 
law 19 years ago: 
The ‘direct threat’ cases are susceptible to classification by the particular factor 
or group of factors from the Arline test that predominate in the analysis. For 
example, a large body of cases can be categorized as ‘catastrophic 
consequences’ cases. These cases focus primarily on the nature and severity of 
potential harm posed by the individual at issue, who in many cases is an HIV-
positive employee or applicant. The courts in such cases have focused 
primarily on the catastrophic consequences of transmission to others. The 
courts have placed little emphasis on the fact that no transmission of HIV may 
ever have been medically documented in circumstances relevant to the 
employment in question or on the fact that the risk of such transmission is 
extremely difficult to quantify. Such cases not only involve HIV-positive 
persons who seek to participate in invasive surgery, but also HIV-positive 
persons who practice dentistry or work with cutting tools in a grocery store, as 
well as persons with another infectious disease such as Hepatitis B who seek 
to work in public safety occupations. Interestingly, when the obverse case has 
presented itself--the danger of an infectious disease being transmitted from a 
patient to the health care professional providing the treatment--the courts have 
focused on the lack of evidence documenting transmission in the relevant 
circumstances, rather than on the ‘catastrophic consequences’ of transmission 
from patient to practitioner. 
 
Another discrete line of cases involves dangerous ‘situations’ and 
‘instrumentalities’ in public safety occupations--such as firefighting or police 
work--where the courts have focused primarily on the unquantifiable risk that 
an officer might not be able to perform his or her duties when his co-workers 
most need him or her or might become incapacitated or impaired while in 
control of a dangerous instrumentality such as a firearm or a police car. Most 
of the cases which uphold exclusions of disabled individuals do not probe very 
deeply into the ‘duration of risk,’ ‘likelihood of potential harm,’ or ‘imminence 
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of harm’ factors of the ‘direct threat’ test. However, a few cases in this area 
have found no ‘direct threat’ when a sufficient connection has not been 
established between the impairment at issue and the instrumentality in 
question. 
 
Virtual blanket exclusions have dominated the realm of transportation cases, 
and most courts have upheld exclusions of individuals whose medical 
conditions--particularly diabetes and epilepsy--have posed risks of 
unconsciousness or incapacitation, especially when those seeking the 
employment have experienced them in the past. For these courts, the beginning 
and end of their analysis has not been Arline. Their analysis has been 
condensed into an insurance analysis--should an employer be required to act as 
the insurer of safety when the stakes are human lives and the instrumentalities 
involved are the least forgiving of error? Indeed, these courts seem to have 
replaced Arline with the policymaking liability analysis formula suggested by 
Circuit Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co. Under the 
‘Hand formula,’ the liability of an alleged tortfeasor is determined by whether 
the burden (‘B’) of taking adequate precautions is exceeded by the product of 
the probability (‘P’) of injury occurring and the gravity of that injury (‘L’) if it 
occurs--B < PL. This formula has been described as the classic ‘American 
formula of balancing magnitude of risk and gravity of harm against utility of 
conduct’ and criticized for ‘its emphasis on economic efficiency and its implicit 
denial of ‘soft’ or ‘human’ variables and individual rights.’ Whatever its merits 
in allocating common law fault, however, a ‘Hand-like’ approach to ‘direct 
threat’ cases substitutes an economic analysis for the Arline analysis of 
scientific evidence intended to protect individual rights from unfounded 
stereotyping about disabilities. Moreover, even in the transportation area, the 
courts’ approach can be volatile. When given the opportunity to apply this 
‘insurer’ analysis to Exxon’s rule excluding past alcoholics from safety-
sensitive positions in the wake of concrete events--such as the Exxon Valdez 
oil spill--the court expressly rejected the same ‘employer-as-insurer’ argument 
that other courts had recognized in cases lacking such substantial history. In 
any event, the general tendency courts have displayed to cast Arline aside in 
transportation cases is at odds with the evolving willingness of safety 
regulators--such as the FAA in the case of diabetic private pilots--to reconsider 
long-held exclusions upon the urging of medical experts at the forefront of 
research in their fields. 
 
Finally, ad hoc ‘safety-threat’ claims arising in unregulated industrial settings 
reveal the employer’s tendency to invoke vague safety concerns as an 
expedient and the unpredictability of judicial application of ‘direct-threat’ 
standard in assessing those asserted concerns. Cases such as Turco, Complete 
Auto Transit, and Chrysler have produced conflicting results on weakly-
documented ‘direct threat’ claims by employers. These cases illustrate a lack 
of consistency, transparency, and analytic vigor when the ‘direct threat’ test is 
left to judicial application. Each case also illustrates the expense and 
dissipation of precious time and litigation resources in protracted proceedings 
over the validity of various medical opinions. 
 
Typhoid Mary, supra note 28, at 932–36 (footnotes omitted). 
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1. With the standards articulated in the Tenth Circuit cases of 
Jarvis and Beverage Distributors, we end up with cases in which excessive 
deference is given to the employer’s position without a way for many 
plaintiffs to thoroughly sift through and vigorously test the employer’s 
position. Indeed, “employees and applicants have been victimized by 
lawyering that appears not to have been up to the task of marshalling the 
medical and scientific evidence needed to survive an employer’s summary 
judgment motion under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”202 
On the other hand, with the approach of Seventh Circuit cases such as 
Stragapede, we put juries in the unenviable position of having to choose 
between dueling expert witnesses when the employer and the employee each 
have medical expert witnesses who have at least apparently addressed the 
Arline factors in some detail and have at least prima facie credibility.203 As 
the author observed in 1999: 
Although there appear to be few ‘‘direct threat’’ cases that 
have been presented to juries rather than resolved on 
motions, there is no reason to believe that a jury verdict 
would provide any better resolution of the medical issues 
and frequently conflicting medical opinions that characterize 
a “‘direct threat”‘ case. Indeed, the jury would seem to be a 
fairly poor means of resolving “direct threat” issues. The 
anonymous and outcome-oriented decisionmaking that 
characterizes juries simply will not suffice in the application 
of the “direct threat” standard. The “direct threat” standard 
involves the weighing of scientific data, evolving scientific 
theories, possibly competing methodologies, and often 
conflicting expert opinions regarding the “direct threat” 
factors of “risk,” “harm,” “severity,” “likelihood,” and 
“imminence.” For this analysis to be meaningful, it cannot 
simply be expressed in a jury verdict that ultimately finds a 
defendant liable or not liable for alleged discrimination on 
the basis of a claimed disability. Even special interrogatories 
to a jury cannot do justice to a legal analysis that recognizes 
the relevant factors but does not—and cannot—supply the 
relevant medical or scientific background and context that is 
crucial to assigning relative importance and perspective to 
those factors in a specific case. The best that any jury can do 
is to pick between two simplified, polarized views of a body 
of scientific or medical evidence that may in reality 
command a spectrum of subtle interpretation and 
implication. Such a condensation of complex issues can 
                                               
 202. Id. at 937. 
 203. Id. at 937–38. 
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hardly be expected in the long run to serve the rights of either 
the disabled or the public interest in safety. The ultimate 
determination is not merely a question of whether the 
plaintiff was discriminated against because of a statutorily 
protected classification as in, for example, Title VII and 
ADEA cases. The ultimate determination in a “direct threat” 
case may have life and death consequences for the plaintiff, 
his or her co-workers, and members of the public at large.204 
2. As the author has seen from his own experience representing 
employers in safety-sensitive industries, “[t]he jury also falls short of the 
demands made by the ‘direct threat’’ test in the area of long-term regulation 
of safety-sensitive industries.”205 The reasons for this become clear as one 
considers the immense challenges that a scenario like that of pilot Andreas 
Lubitz and GermanWings would present if a U.S.-based airline, which is 
more aggressive in protecting passengers and less deferential to pilot rights 
than its European counterparts, had acted decisively to avert disaster before 
it happened by disqualifying the pilot from flight duty. ADA litigation—of 
the kind the author experience first-hand in Witter v. Delta Air Lines206—
would result in federal court. Indeed, the Witter case involved a senior 
passenger jet captain who had manifested disturbing behaviors in the cockpit 
creating real safety risks.207 An aeromedical consultant to whom the airline 
referred the pilot diagnosed him under the DSM-IV criteria as displaying the 
kinds of thoughts and behaviors typically associated with narcissistic 
personality disorder and bipolar disorder.208 However, in those relatively 
early days of ADA Title I litigation, the airline avoided having to grapple 
with the direct-threat defense, because the ADA, as it was interpreted by the 
U.S. Supreme Court at the time, allowed the airline to successfully argue that, 
as a matter of law, the pilot failed to show he was disqualified from a 
sufficiently broad range of jobs that he could be considered “disabled” within 
the meaning of the Act.209 However, the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 
would today not permit resolution of the case on that ground.210 The direct-
threat defense would have to be raised by the airline, and the complications 
                                               
 204. Id. at 938–39 (footnotes omitted). 
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 206. Witter v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 1193 (N.D. Ga. 1997), aff’d, 138 F.3d 
1366 (11th Cir. 1998). 
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 209. Indeed, the United States Civil Rights Commission singled the Witter case out for 
highlighted discussion—and criticism without regard to the safety-sensitive nature of the 
passenger airline industry—in a major 1998 report. See U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, 
HELPING EMPLOYERS COMPLY WITH THE ADA: AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW THE UNITED STATES 
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WITH DISABILITIES ACT 88–89 (Roy G. Moy, ed 1998). 
 210. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified in 
scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.). 
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of litigating the case before a jury would be immense for an employer of 
thousands of pilots in the most safety-sensitive of civilian industries:  
Although the ADA emphasizes determinations focused on 
“individuals,” the “direct threat” analysis addresses 
important and recurring situations in safety-sensitive 
industries. The consequences of the “direct threat” analysis 
for both the disabled individual, his or her employer, and the 
general public demand that any “direct threat” decision be 
fully explained and supported by relevant medical and 
scientific evidence. The guidance from such a determination 
is not just important to the individuals and entities concerned 
in a particular case. That case may provide guidance that 
proves to be essential in defining many parameters of safety-
sensitive employment in the future (for example, what 
constitutes a “significant risk” in a particular safety-sensitive 
occupation, what kinds of harm must be eliminated to reduce 
the risk to an “acceptable” level, under what circumstances 
is potential harm ‘‘severe” and “imminent,” what functions 
of the job are both essential and safety-sensitive, and what 
kinds of measures either do or do not sufficiently reduce a 
“significant risk” to “acceptable” levels?). A jury verdict is 
woefully inadequate to provide that crucial element in 
potentially precedent-setting applications of the “direct 
threat” test. At best, a jury would be called upon to choose 
between two sets of competing medical or scientific expert 
opinions. The jury is not allowed to compromise between, 
harmonize, or blend such competing opinions. Nor is a jury 
competent to do so.211 
The legislative history of the ADA, the regulations 
promulgated by the EEOC, and the other governmental 
documents issued to implement the ADA’s provisions and 
the EEOC’s regulations show that next to no meaningful 
analysis was given to the competency of the courts to deal 
with “direct-threat” questions or what kinds of procedures or 
adjunct processes would need to be developed to create a 
meaningful infrastructure to create competency lacking in 
the typical litigation process.212 That is why the author, 
                                               
 211. Typhoid Mary, supra note 28, at 932–36 (footnotes omitted). 
 212. As the author wrote in 1999: 
Congress left largely unaddressed whether such a policy choice is justified in 
the cases involving ‘direct threats’ to safety or health. Although Congress 
specifically provided for some of the ‘direct threat’ determinations to be made 
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drawing upon his experience with the airline industry and 
his study of other safety sensitive industries, opined that the 
process to bring coherence to the incoherence Congress and 
the EEOC have left in this portion of the direct-threat 
defense was one long-used in safety-sensitive industries. 
“Indeed, the answer is as old as the rise of safety-sensitive 
industries themselves,” the medical review panel, in which 
the employee or applicant is thoroughly examined and 
evaluated by a physician of the employer’s choice; a 
physician of the employee’s or applicant’s choice; and, if 
those physicians disagree as to whether employing the 
individual in the job in question poses a “direct threat,” a 
neutral physician designated by mutual agreement of the 
other two physicians.213 
3. How the Nation’s Experience Through the Quintessential Safety-
Sensitive American Railroad and Airline Industries Under the 
Railway Labor Act Illuminates the Path to Coherence Through the 
Tripartite Medical Review Process 
The Supreme Court blessed just such an approach in Gunther v. San 
Diego & Arizona E. Ry. Company,214 a proceeding under the Railway Labor 
Act (RLA),215 in which the Court enforced an arbitration award that 
reinstated an employee based on a medical panel’s opinion, when the 
employee’s employer, a rail carrier, refused compliance.216 Mr. Justice 
Black’s opinion for the Court is quite succinctly illuminating on this point: 
                                               
by the Secretary of Health and Human Services regarding infectious diseases 
in food-handling occupations, Congress did not have much in the way of 
deliberations over the issue of whether the judiciary should be the institution 
which makes the determinations affecting other safety-sensitive industries 
under the ‘direct threat’ standard. 
 
Id. at 936 (footnote omitted). 
 213. As to the provenance of such medical review panels: 
Before the ADA and other employment discrimination laws were enacted at 
the federal level, union-represented employees won protections from arbitrary 
or unsupported dismissal from their employment based on alleged health or 
safety concerns of their employers. In the railroad industry, for example, issues 
of whether an employee was medically qualified to continue working in a 
safety-sensitive position, such as an engineer, were resolved by bipartisan 
panels of physicians selected by the employer and the employee or his union. 
 
Id. at 945 (footnote omitted). 
 214. 382 U.S. 257, 258–60 (1965).  
 215. 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. (2012).  
 216. Gunther, 382 U.S. at 358–62. 
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The courts below were also of the opinion that the 
[Adjustment] Board went beyond its jurisdiction in 
appointing a medical board of three physicians to decide for 
it the question of fact relating to petitioner’s physical 
qualifications to act as an engineer. We do not agree. The 
Adjustment Board, of course, is not limited to common-law 
rules of evidence in obtaining information. The medical 
board was composed of three doctors, one of whom was 
appointed by the company, one by petitioner, and the third 
by these two doctors. This not only seems an eminently fair 
method of selecting doctors to perform this medical task but 
it appears from the record that it is commonly used in the 
railroad world for the very purpose it was used here. In fact, 
the record shows that under respondent’s present collective 
bargaining agreement with its engineers provision is made 
for determining a dispute precisely like the one before us by 
the appointment of a board of doctors in precisely the 
manner the Board used here. This Court has said that the 
Railway Labor Act’s ‘provisions dealing with the 
Adjustment Board were to be considered as compulsory 
arbitration in this limited field. On a question like the one 
before us here, involving the health of petitioner, and his 
physical ability to operate an engine, arbitrators would 
probably find it difficult to find a better method for arriving 
at the truth than by the use of doctors selected as these 
doctors were.217 
The RLA still provides the best model for resolving the very kinds 
of questions at issue in determining whether an employer has met its burden 
under the ADA of proving that a particular individual with a disability poses 
a disqualifying “direct-threat” under the ADA that cannot be accommodated 
without continuing to pose a significant risk of substantial harm to either the 
individual or to others within the zone of the individual’s work.218 Indeed, 
“the procedures outlined in Gunther describe a multi-stage process that 
fosters and maximizes achievement of two important, but otherwise often 
inconsistent, goals —consideration of a range of medical views and finality 
in the resolution of medical issues about which medical professionals may 
disagree.”219 As Arbitrator Richard R. Kasher has observed in the airline 
industry context, 
[t]he establishment of tripartite medical boards or single 
neutral doctor review procedures in cases when an 
                                               
 217. Id. at 371 (footnote omitted). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Typhoid Mary, supra note 28, at 948 (footnotes omitted). 
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employee’s physical condition is in controversy is not 
uncommon; and has been viewed by the Supreme Court of 
the United States as being an “‘eminently fair”‘ procedure. 
Obviously, the parties here recognized the fairness of such a 
procedure because they established one [in their collective 
bargaining agreement].220 
Taking Arbitrator Kasher’s final point, the question for us is how 
such a procedure can be established in the ADA context. (Indeed, it is a 
process that has suggested itself to employer and employees to resolve ADA 
disputes even in industries outside of railways and airlines.221) That is the 
subject of Section III, infra. 
III. MAKING TRIPARTITE MEDICAL REVIEW PANELS FOR 
ADJUDICATING THE EMPLOYER’S DIRECT-THREAT DEFENSE TO ADA 
CLAIMS WORKABLE IN IMPLEMENTATION, PARTICULARLY FOR 
SAFETY-SENSITIVE SECTORS 
The challenge we meet in this Section is: How to adapt a process 
from the RLA and the realm of collectively-bargained procedures in the 
railway and airline industries so that it becomes an integral part of the process 
for litigating the “direct-threat” defense in ADA cases? In traversing this 
terrain, we will start with the basic proposition that the author suggested in 
1999, but we will expand upon it and fortify it with further ideas and 
opportunities that either were not available 20 years ago, or have come to the 
fore in the intervening span of time. 
A. EEOC Regulations 
The EEOC clearly has rule-making powers to implement the ADA – 
it was part of the original statutory command, and it was re-invigorated with 
                                               
 220. In the Matter of an Arbitration Between Delta Air Lines, Inc. and Air Line Pilots 
Ass’n, Grievance No. 92-14 (April 25, 1993) (unpublished award); Witter v. Delta Air Lines, 
Inc., 966 F. Supp. 1193, 1196–97 (N.D. Ga. 1997), aff’d, 138 F.3d 1366 (11th Cir. 1998), 
discusses general the airlines’ tripartite medical review process. Of course, under the Railway 
Labor Act, there is judicial review, albeit appropriately deferential and circumscribed, of a 
system board of adjustment’s decision founded upon a tri-partite medical review panel 
determination. See generally Alvin L. Goldman, Selecting The Correct Standard For Judicial 
Review Of Airline Grievance Arbitration Decisions, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 743 (2007). 
 221. Borgialli v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., 235 F.3d 1284, 1285–89 (10th Cir. 
2000)(describing a tri-partite medical review approach arising when employer and employee 
ended up with physicians offering diametrically opposed medical assessments of whether 
blaster in mine diagnosed with several psychiatric and physical disorders was a “direct threat” 
to himself and others). 
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the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.222 The call the author made for the 
EEOC to use its rule-making powers in this area is every bit as relevant today: 
If the “‘direct threat”’ standard is to be implemented in a 
meaningful and consistent manner that effectuates the rights 
of the disabled and other constituencies in our society, the 
EEOC must take a leadership role in developing a procedure 
for making “‘direct threat”‘ determinations. The full extent 
of the substantive and procedural regulations needed to 
promote resolution of “direct threat” issues cannot be made 
in the abstract. Nevertheless, the process for developing 
those regulations would contain a number of discrete 
stages.223 
To start the rule-making process, the author called upon the EEOC 
to identify the safety-sensitive industries and occupations that require special 
attention under the “direct threat” standard.224 As a mechanism for initiating 
this effort, the author invited the EEOC to “issue a public call for the 
identification of such industries,” and suggest that this might best be done, 
“through an advance notice of proposed rule-making under the 
Administrative Procedure Act,” or APA.225 In addition, the EEOC needs to 
work with other constituencies with a vital interest in the matter, including 
“medical associations, labor organizations, consumer groups, disability 
advocacy groups, and employer and trade associations”226 and “safety-
sensitive industries that require special attention” such as “the airline 
industry, railroads, marine shipping, over-the-road transportation, medical 
care providers, law enforcement, public safety, and food processing and 
handling.”227 As a result of this process, the author argued, “the EEOC should 
publish a list by industry and, where appropriate, by occupation, for which it 
will develop regulations to establish standards and procedures for making the 
                                               
 222. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 12101). 
 223. Typhoid Mary, supra note 28, at 950. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Typhoid Mary, supra note 28, at 950–51 (footnotes omitted) (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 
553, 556–57 (discussing rule-making by federal agencies)). As the author noted, “[t]his was 
the means that the EEOC used in 1990 ‘to inform the public that the Commission had begun 
the process of developing substantive regulations pursuant to Title I of the ADA and inviting 
comment from interested groups and individuals.” Id. at 951. The author also encouraged the 
EEOC to “take the initiative to contact directly and work closely with federal and state 
agencies that regulate medical qualifications for employment in various safety-sensitive 
industries. Id. at 951. 
 226. Id. at 951 (footnotes omitted). 
 227. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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necessary determinations when an applicant or employee is excluded on the 
grounds that he or she constitutes a ‘direct threat.’”228 
The next step in the author’s vision of EEOC rule-making on “direct 
threats” would be to create specific industry-specific bipartisan panels” in 
each safety-sensitive industry to “advise and assist the EEOC in preparing 
regulations to establish the process for determining ‘direct threat’ issues in 
that industry,” because the “specialized knowledge and authorities 
understanding of the issues” possessed by each panel would be a crucial 
component to creating legitimacy for those issues on which the EEOC does 
not possess the requisite business and industry specific knowledge.”229 
Another aspect of the author’s regulatory proposal focused on elucidating 
more scientifically and relevantly the contexts for and core concepts of the 
Arline factors, including the concept of “risk” and “concepts of risk, 
significance of risk, nature of harm, and imminence of representative risk-
creating events for the principal safety-sensitive occupations within the 
industry.”230 
On this last point, a very insightful article with a proposal of 
significance was published two years after the author’s, and that proposal 
dovetails nicely with the one described here. In Disciplining the Americans 
with Disabilities Act’s Direct Threat Defense, Brian Prestes proposed that the 
EEOC “adopt explicit numerical benchmarks to serve as” a “‘‘modulus’ by 
which to measure whether a risk is clearly significant, clearly insignificant, 
or somewhere in between.”231 The proposal is intriguing, but it would only 
work if integrated into the kind of holistic rule-making process for “direct 
threats” that this author has advocated. Indeed, the EEOC has sometimes 
shown difficulty on its own in even sorting out the basics of what is a safety-
sensitive industry – having recently opined driving a public transportation 
bus in a municipal bus service is not a safety sensitive job.232 This is an 
                                               
 228. Id. at 951–52 (footnotes omitted). At that point, “the list should encourage self-
identification and participation in the EEOC’s rule-making process by industries or groups not 
previously identified.” Id. 
 229. Id. at 952. 
 230. Id. at 952. Similarly, the author notes that 
[t]he regulations must also address the relevant safety-related qualifications for 
safety-sensitive employment in each industry. Those qualifications will not 
necessarily be merely the minimal qualifications required for licensure by a 
relevant federal or state agency. Safety-related qualifications must 
accommodate the need to set higher standards to achieve low risks of harm in 
particularly safety-sensitive occupations. Such standards must, of course, be 
rationally related to the performance of essential job functions and cannot be 
used to screen out otherwise qualified individuals with disabilities. 
 
Id. 
 231. Brian S. Prestes, Disciplining the Americans with Disabilities Act’s Direct Threat 
Defense, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 409, 411 (2001). 
 232. See Paula Barran, So Which Positions Are Safety Sensitive?, DJC OREGON (May 23, 
2008), http://djcoregon.com/news/2008/05/23/so-which-positions-are-safety-sensitive/ (last 
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emblematic example of why close collaboration with the full panoply of 
safety-sensitive industries and the experts who work within those industries 
is essential to an intelligent rule-making effort in the “direct-threat” area. 
What the author proposed as the “heart” of these “direct threat” 
regulations is “the codification of a tripartite medical review process that 
ensures objectivity, neutrality, fairness, and due process to employees and 
applicants — without resort to litigation in the courts.”233 How is that to be 
done? The following are the author’s prescriptions: 
1. First, “the regulations should provide that whenever 
an employer seeks to exclude an applicant or employee from 
employment because that individual purportedly poses a 
‘direct threat’’ in performing essential job functions, or fails 
to meet safety-based qualification standards, the employer 
can only do so if (1) it has retained a qualified, independent 
physician with an established medical expertise (preferably 
“Board certified”) in the health problems that allegedly pose 
the “direct threat” and (2) that physician analyzes each of the 
Arline factors and concludes after examining the individual, 
reviewing his or her medical history, and consulting with his 
or her treating physician, if any, that the individual poses a 
“direct threat’ that cannot be reduced to an acceptable level 
through a reasonable accommodation.”234 
2. Second, “[t]he regulations should provide that the 
individual may retain and designate a similarly qualified 
medical specialist of his or her own choosing to provide an 
independent analysis using the same procedure.”235 
3. Third, the regulations should require that “[i]n the 
event that the individual’s medical specialist disagrees with 
the employer’s designated specialist and concludes that the 
individual does not pose a ‘‘direct threat,’’ that the two 
specialists shall agree upon and designate a third medical 
specialist to review the case and make the final 
determination whether the individual poses a ‘direct threat,’’ 
or whether reasonable accommodation can reduce the risk 
below the ‘direct threat’’ threshold.”236 
                                               
visited Sept. 30, 2018)(describing EEOC Office of Council Opinion Letter that found city bus 
drivers were not employed in “safety-sensitive” positions). 
 233. Typhoid Mary, supra note 28, at 953–54. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at 954. 
 236. Id. 
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4. Fourth, acknowledging that “[t]his process may be 
expensive . . . [and] because the medical review process 
carries a more than de minimis expense that the employer 
should bear the cost of the process. This will discourage 
employers from invoking ‘safety’ concerns lightly, and 
recognizes the usual disparity of resources between 
employing entities and their employees.”237 
5. Fifth, the regulations should provide, where “the 
employer’s workers are represented by a labor 
organization,” legal authority (which may require 
coordinating amendments of the RLA and the National 
Labor Relations Act238) for “the employer and the union to 
negotiate a different allocation of expense between them 
through good-faith collective bargaining.”239 
6. The regulations should make clear that “[c]ourt 
involvement in this process should be minimal.”240 Indeed, 
only at three junctures would judicial intervention be 
authorized: 
First, if it were to be determined in the medical review process that 
the employee or applicant would not pose a “direct threat” should the 
employer provide a reasonable accommodation, the employer would be 
required to provide the accommodation unless it could prove in a court 
proceeding that to do so would create an ‘undue hardship’’ as defined in the 
ADA. Second, if an employer or, in rarer occasions, an employee or his labor 
representative refused to participate in the medical review process, the 
regulations would provide for judicial intervention to compel compliance, 
similar to a suit to compel arbitration. Third, the regulations should provide 
for limited judicial review of the medical panel results. Because the panel of 
medical experts will have determined the substantive medical issues, the 
bases for challenging the panel results should be limited to only those 
required to ensure observance of due process and impartiality by panel 
members. Accordingly, judicial review of medical panel results should be 
limited to (1) failure of the panel to comply with the regulations; (2) failure 
of the panel to confine itself to medical and scientific issues as provided for 
in the regulations; (3) a panel result that would require an employer to violate 
a clearly established safety standard or safety-related employment 
qualification established by a federal or state regulatory agency with 
                                               
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 954. See 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. 
 239. Typhoid Mary, supra note 28, at 954. 
 240. Id 
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jurisdiction over the industry and occupation in question; or (4) fraud or 
corruption by a member of the panel or a party to the process.241 
Of course, just as the case was in 1999, “[t]he author recognizes that 
the EEOC would likely need considerably more meaningful increases in 
funding to develop the regulations proposed below in addition to fulfilling its 
other statutorily mandated duties.”242 The author’s sanguine hopes almost 20 
years ago that the EEOC would be better supported and funded in order to 
carry out such a mission,243 should the political will arise to make it happen, 
were met with mixed realities.244 
B. Can District Courts Use Fed. R. Civ. P. 53, “Special Masters,” 
to Create Their Own Tripartite Medical Review Panel Process 
in ADA Cases? 
While the best solution to establishing a sensible procedure for 
making “direct-threat” determinations in ADA litigation is issuance of a 
carefully crafted regulation, there are things that courts and employers can 
do in the meantime to make the current process more rational. First, as 
discussed in this subsection, federal district courts might consider whether 
they can use the inherent authority to appoint special masters, as reinforced 
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53, to implement in each federal district 
a tripartite medical review panel process for evaluating “direct-threat” issues 
in ADA cases. Second, as discussed in the next subsection, employers can 
use the breathtakingly broadened scope of the Federal Arbitration Act 
wrought by the U.S. Supreme Court to implement tripartite medical review 
in ADA claims that are subject to pre- and post-employment mandatory 
arbitration agreements that encompass EDL claims. 
Federal courts have long claimed as part of their equity jurisdiction 
the power to appoint special masters to assist the court in a wide variety of 
matters and with a wide range of determinations.245 Since the adoption of the 
                                               
 241. Id. at 954–55 
 242. Id. at 950 n. 434. 
 243. Id. 
 244. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC Budget and Staffing 
History 1980 to Present, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/budgetandstaffing.cfm (last visited 
Sept. 30, 2018). 
 245. Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin & Jonathan M. Redgrave, The Evolution And Impact Of 
The New Federal Rule Governing Special Masters, 51 FED. LAW. 34, 35 & 39 n. 1 (2004). As 
the authors point out, the inherent authority of federal district judges in this area has long been 
recognized: 
See Ex Parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312–13 (1920) (holding that a federal 
court has inherent authority to appoint a master whether sitting in equity or 
law); Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512, 524–25 (1889) (stating that the 
reference of a case to a master has always been within the power of a court of 
chancery). 
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, most of the practice around the 
appointment, use, and authority of special masters has been focused on the 
provisions of Rule 53, captioned “Masters.”246 In pertinent part, Rule 53 
provides in its current form: 
(a) Appointment. 
(1) Scope. Unless a statute provides otherwise, a court may 
appoint a master only to: 
(A) perform duties consented to by the parties; [or] 
(B) hold trial proceedings and make or recommend 
findings of fact on issues to be decided without a jury if 
appointment is warranted by: 
(i) some exceptional condition; or 
(ii) the need to perform an accounting or resolve a difficult 
computation of damages; or 
 
(C) address pretrial and post trial matters that cannot be 
effectively and timely addressed by an available district 
judge or magistrate judge of the district.247 
In considering how this rule applies to the author’s proposal, 
Sections (a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B) would provide grounds for using the rule to 
implement a tripartite medical review panel process. If the disabled 
individual and the employer agreed to submit the “direct-threat” 
determination to a tripartite medical review panel process, then Rule 
53(a)(1)(A) would make it very easy to implement. Whether both parties 
would agree is a different—and much more variable—question. The party 
who believes it is likely not to end up with a medical opinion that favors its 
litigation process, for example, is likely not to agree to the appointment. 
Likewise, a party who wants to appeal to the sympathies of a jury, on the one 
hand, or to the jury’s fears and prejudices, on the other hand, may very well 
also withhold its consent. Furthermore, a party who wants to accept Judge 
Raymond Kethledge’s position in Michael – that medical evidence is not 
                                               
Id. at 35 n. 1; see also Jerome I. Braun, Special Masters in Federal Court, 161 F.R.D. 211 
(1995); Irving R. Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53 58 COLUM. L. REV. 452 
(1958). 
 246. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 53. 
 247. Id. 
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necessary and that the factfinder (or the district judge on summary 
judgment!) can “determine” that a disabled individual poses a “direct threat” 
by non-medical, objective evidence, including “observed” conduct – will 
want to avoid the sobering rationality of a medical opinion entirely.248 
In cases in which the parties do not have a commonality of consent 
to appointment of a tripartite medical review panel under Rule 53, a court 
would have to confront whether such an approach is permitted under Rule 
53(a)(1)(B).249 The lengthy analysis of the nature of the “direct threat” 
inquiry in the author’s current and previous articles provide a reasonable 
foundation on which to argue that the nature of the “direct threat” inquiry 
presents just such an “exceptional condition” that warrants the 
appointment.250 
Another phrase, however, in Rule 53(a)(1)(B) might be seen as an 
intractable sticking point. This language comes from the 2003 amendment to 
Rule 53, to which the Advisory Committee offered these notes: 
2003 Amendment 
Rule 53 is revised extensively to reflect changing practices 
in using masters. From the beginning in 1938, Rule 53 
focused primarily on special masters who perform trial 
functions. . . . Rule 53 continues to address trial masters as 
well, but permits appointment of a trial master in an action 
to be tried to a jury only if the parties consent. The new rule 
clarifies the provisions that govern the appointment and 
function of masters for all purposes. Rule 53(g) also changes 
the standard of review for findings of fact made or 
recommended by a master. The core of the original Rule 53 
remains, including its prescription that appointment of a 
master must be the exception and not the rule.251 
Reading more deeply into the comments, we find the Advisory 
Committee elaborates even more on the limitations on use of trial masters 
introduced by the 2003 Amendments: 
Trial Masters. Use of masters for the core functions of trial 
has been progressively limited. These limits are reflected in 
the provisions of subparagraph (a)(1)(B) that restrict 
appointments to exercise trial functions. . . . Although the 
                                               
 248. Michael v. City of Troy Police Dep’t, 808 F.2d 304, 307–09 (6th Cir. 2015) 
(affirming summary judgment for employer on, inter alia, the issue whether the disabled 
individual posed a “direct threat”). 
 249. See Fed. R. Civ. P. (a)(1)(B). 
 250. See Typhoid Mary, supra note 28. 
 251. Committee Notes on Rules - 2003 Amendment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 53. 
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provision that a reference “shall be the exception and not the 
rule” is deleted, its meaning is embraced for this setting by 
the exceptional condition requirement. 
***  
The use of a trial master without party consent is abolished 
as to matters to be decided by a jury unless a statute provides 
for this practice.252 
This Advisory Committee note might very well be seen as precluding 
the very thing that the author is suggesting here – that federal district judges 
could refer the analysis of the “direct threat” issue to a tripartite medical 
review process. But before jumping to that conclusion, further analysis of 
what, exactly, is a “matter to be decided by a jury” in an ADA case raising 
the “direct-threat” issue. As originally enacted in 1990, ADA Title I did not 
carry any right to a jury trial. Without having given a great deal of obvious 
thought to the matter of issues such as “direct threat” that are unique to the 
ADA, Congress simply incorporated wholesale the process for litigation 
under Title VII extant as of 1990: 
(a) POWERS, REMEDIES, AND PROCEDURES- 
The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in sections 
705, 706, 707, 709, and 710 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(42 U.S.C. 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-
9) shall be the powers, remedies, and procedures this title 
provides to the Commission, to the Attorney General, or to 
any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability 
in violation of any provision of this Act, or regulations 
promulgated under section 106, concerning 
employment.253In 1990, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 did not provide a right to jury trial; in fact, it was 
concern over the bias of juries against plaintiffs that led 
Congress to create an equitable cause of action tried to 
district judges.254 It was, however, on the next year that 
Congress passed a statute with an entirely separate 
provenance from the ADA’s – the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
– which was intended to overturn a number of recent 
                                               
 252. Id. 
 253. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 107 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a)). 
 254. See, e.g., Comment, The Right to Jury Trial Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 167, 180 (1969). Contra Vincenza G. Aversano, Karen M. 
Kalikow, & Lisa S. Presser, Jury Trial Right Under Title VII: The Need for Judicial 
Reinterpretation, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 613, 639 (1985). 
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Supreme Court decisions interpreting the EDLs.255 One of 
the provisions of the 1991 Act, now codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981(a), added tort-type damages (compensatory and 
punitive) along with a statutory right to a jury trial: 
SEC. 102. DAMAGES IN CASES OF INTENTIONAL 
DISCRIMINATION. 
The Revised Statutes are amended by inserting after section 
1977 (42 U.S.C. 1981) the following new section: 
SEC. 1977A. DAMAGES IN CASES OF INTENTIONAL 
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT.SEC. 1977A. 
DAMAGES IN CASES OF INTENTIONAL 
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT. 
                                               
 255. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 1981). Section 3 of the 1991 act stated the purposes of the amendments it made as – 
 
SEC. 3. PURPOSES. 
 
The purposes of this Act are-- 
 
(1) to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination and 
unlawful harassment in the workplace; 
 
(2) to codify the concepts of `business necessity’ and `job related’ enunciated 
by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and 
in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. 
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); 
  
(3) to confirm statutory authority and provide statutory guidelines for the 
adjudication of disparate impact suits under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.); and 
 
(4) to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope 
of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to 
victims of discrimination. 
 
Id. (emphasis supplied). 
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(a) RIGHT OF RECOVERY- 
*** 
(2) DISABILITY- In an action brought by a complaining 
party under the powers, remedies, and procedures set forth 
in section 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as 
provided in section 107(a) of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12117(a)) . . . against a 
respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional 
discrimination . . . or who violated . . . section 102 of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12112), 
or committed a violation of section 102(b)(5) of the Act, 
against an individual, the complaining party may recover 
compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in 
subsection (b), in addition to any relief authorized by section 
706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent. 
*** 
(c) JURY TRIAL- If a complaining party seeks 
compensatory or punitive damages under this section-- 
(1) any party may demand a trial by jury256 
“ . . . a trial by jury”. A question virtually leaps at us from these 
words: “a trial by jury.” And that question is: “A trial by jury” as to what 
issue(s)? The statute actually does not tell us directly. Some might argue that 
it means as to all issues. But we know that equity (back pay, front pay, 
instatement, reinstatement, and injunction) is a significant part of the picture, 
and we remember from cases such as Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover257 
that the jury trial of right does not simply swamp all issues regardless of their 
nature and pedigree. And while some have suggested the facile analogy of 
Title VII claims to 18th century tort claims258 for purposes of applying the 
time-machine test of cases such as Curtis v. Loether,259 there is no credible 
18th century analogy in common-law civil litigation for determining whether 
                                               
 256. Id. § 102(a)(2) & (c). 
 257. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 US 500, 510–11 (1959). 
 258. Aversano et al., supra note 254, at 613–17. 
 259. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192–295 (1974) (finding 7th Amendment requires 
Fair Housing Act Claims brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1968 to be jury-tried because 
it is analogous to common-law torts involving refusal of lodgings claims against innkeepers 
or defamation.).  But see Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 
558, 584 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (suggesting sensible limits on the use of the Court’s “time-
machine” for divining analogies between modern statutory causes of action as compared “to 
the 18th-century cases permitted in the law courts of England.”). 
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an employee with a disability poses a direct threat to the health or safety of 
himself or others – indeed, the question is entirely alien to the difficult world 
of the Founding Era.260 There’s certainly a hint – since the Act now creates 
the availability of tort-type damages (compensatory and punitive), and since 
the right to a jury trial is keyed to those cases in which the plaintiff actually 
“seeks compensatory or punitive damages,” certainly the damages issues 
raised by claiming “compensatory or punitive” damages are committed to 
jury determination.261 Yet, does that mean that all issues within ADA Title 
I—which had not yet even taken effect and was not a major focus of the 1991 
Act—are committed to a jury? Clearly not, for the 1991 Act contains what 
appears to be an express reservation for failure-to-accommodate claims 
where the employer made at least a good-faith effort to comply with the Act: 
(3) REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND GOOD 
FAITH EFFORT- In cases where a discriminatory practice 
involves the provision of a reasonable accommodation 
pursuant to section 102(b)(5) of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 . . . , damages may not be awarded 
under this section where the covered entity demonstrates 
good faith efforts, in consultation with the person with the 
disability who has informed the covered entity that 
accommodation is needed, to identify and make a 
reasonable accommodation that would provide such 
individual with an equally effective opportunity and would 
not cause an undue hardship on the operation of the 
business.262 
If compensatory and punitive damages are not available under such 
circumstances, then the jury trial keyed into their being claimed would seem 
to be, perforce, unavailable. Furthermore, there may very well be cases where 
only back pay, front pay, instatement, and/or reinstatement remedies are 
sought. By the very limitation of the jury trial right to cases in which plaintiffs 
“claim compensatory or punitive damages,” those cases would not be 
subjected to jury trial. 
The direct-threat determination is, by its very nature, tied up in the 
process of determining whether a reasonable accommodation exists to permit 
a disabled individual to perform the essential functions of a job without 
posing a significant risk of substantial harm to the individual or to others 
                                               
 260. See, e.g., The Disabled Vets of the American Revolution, WASHINGTON COLLEGE 
(Sept.9, 2015), https://www.washcoll.edu/live/news/7712-the-disabled-vets-of-the-american-
revolution (discussing the historical research of Benjamin Irvin). 
 261. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102(c), 105 Stat. 1072, 1073 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)). 
 262. Id. § 102(a)(3) (emphasis supplied). 
2019] INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS VERSUS PUBLIC SAFETY 215 
within the ambit of the individual’s employment.263 It would seem apparent 
that in most cases in which an employer sought and obtained a facially 
reasonable medical opinion before deciding it could not accommodate the 
individual, the employer has acted in good faith provided that its decision 
actually was informed by and was made in reliance upon that facially 
reasonable medical opinion. Thus, it would seem highly unlikely that an 
ADA plaintiff could plausibly claim compensatory or punitive damages in 
an ADA case where the employer confronted the “direct-threat” issue by 
good-faith consultation and involvement of a competent medical expert. It is 
the author’s contention that in such cases, a federal district court can refer the 
direct-threat determination to a tripartite medical review panel, in which the 
disabled individual can designate a medical expert on his or her behalf 
(including one previously consulted before litigation by the disabled 
individual), and in which the employer’s and individual’s medical experts 
can designate a third expert to resolve any conflict between their medical 
views. 
What, however, does Rule 53 permit to be done with the 
determination by the tripartite process whether a particular plaintiff posed a 
direct threat? The 2003 amendments to Rule 53(f) also changed the effect of 
a special master’s determination: 
(f) Action on the Master’s Order, Report, or 
Recommendations. 
(1) Opportunity for a Hearing; Action in General. In acting 
on a master’s order, report, or recommendations, the court 
must give the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard; 
may receive evidence; and may adopt or affirm, modify, 
wholly or partly reject or reverse, or resubmit to the master 
with instructions. 
(2) Time to Object or Move to Adopt or Modify. A party 
may file objections to--or a motion to adopt or modify--the 
master’s order, report, or recommendations no later than 21 
days after a copy is served, unless the court sets a different 
time. 
(3) Reviewing Factual Findings. The court must decide de 
novo all objections to findings of fact made or recommended 
by a master, unless the parties, with the court’s approval, 
stipulate that: 
(A) the findings will be reviewed for clear error 
                                               
 263. See, e.g., Typhoid Mary, supra note 28, at 851–52. 
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*** 
(4) Reviewing Legal Conclusions. The court must decide de 
novo all objections to conclusions of law made or 
recommended by a master.264 
While the trial judge would be required to perform a de novo review 
in a hearing outside of the presence of the jury at trial, it seems unlikely that 
the judge would second-guess the findings of a tripartite medical review 
panel, particularly given its well-recognized effectualness in the RLA case 
law.265 
A federal district judge might also see the direct-threat question itself 
as a pre-trial matter, to be determined through a tripartite medical review 
panel using a Rule 53 reference.266 In that case, the jury trial issue raised by 
treating the matter as a special master’s trial of an issue under Rule 
53(a)(1)(B) disappears.267 The jury in such as case might be instructed that 
the report was entitled to deference, or considerable weight, or even that it is 
binding as to the determination of whether the plaintiff posed a “ . . . [a] 
significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or 
others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable 
accommodation.”268 That would leave it for the jury to hear evidence from 
the parties and determine issues such as: 
[1] Whether the employer is entitled to rely on the medical 
analysis, if there is colorable evidence that the employer 
made up its mind in advance and used the “direct-threat” 
assertion as a pretext for disability discrimination?269 
[2] Whether a reasonable accommodation within a particular 
employer’s business might include employment in or 
transfer to an open position in which the individual’s 
employment would not pose a “direct threat.”270 
                                               
 264. Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(f). 
 265. See, e.g., Gunther v. San Diego & Ariz. E. Ry. Co., 382 U.S. 257 (1965). 
 266. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(a)(1)(C) (empowering court to appoint a special master “to 
address pretrial and post[-]trial matters that cannot be effectively and timely addressed by an 
available district judge or magistrate judge of the district”). 
 267. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(a)(1)(B)–(C). 
 268. 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(r) 
 269. A triable fact issue was found on this very point in Taylor v. Rice, 451 F.3d 898, 
911–12 (D.C.Cir. 2006)(in reversing a summary judgment that the district court had rendered 
in employer’s favor, the Appeals Court observed that “[e]ven if the Secretary had established 
that Taylor’s pulmonary condition was a non-discriminatory disqualifying characteristic, 
Taylor has some evidence suggesting that his pulmonary condition was a pretext-that his HIV-
positive status is the true reason he was not hired.”). 
 270. See, e.g., EEOC v. Curry Cty., 451 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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[3] If there is an accommodation that might sufficiently 
reduce the threat but the employer refuses to offer the 
accommodation on the grounds it would cause an undue 
hardship, whether the employer has met its burden to prove 
undue hardship.271 
These are areas that do not require medical expertise. They may be 
decided by juries without introducing the kind of incoherence about which 
the author has been concerned since his law-practice days. 
The Chief Judges of each of the 94 federal districts in the United 
States are encouraged to consider whether to adopt a standing order (or 
Internal Operating Procedure) to use a tripartite medical review panel process 
in the special master’s role under one of the Fed. R. Civ. P. 53 provisions 
analyzed above.272 While not necessarily a common practice, such standing 
orders for the routing and disposition of certain kinds of claims is not 
unprecedented. For example, the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Georgia for many years maintained a standing order that 
any claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would first be 
referred to a U.S. Magistrate Judge273 who would, as special master274, 
conduct all of the proceedings in the case, including where necessary a non-
jury trial, and issue a report and recommendation, which could be challenged 
before the district judge or could be introduced into evidence in a subsequent 
trial before the district judge,275 if one of the parties demanded that further 
step.276 
                                               
 271. Id. 
 272. See, e.g., Shira Scheindlin, We Need Help: The Increasing Use Of Special Masters 
In Federal Court, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 479 (2009). 
 273. See Parker v. Dole, 668 F. Supp. 1563 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (rejecting challenge to the 
Northern District’s Internal Operating Procedure); Lisa B. Golan & Julie S. Northup, Judge 
Baverman Provides Valuable View from the Bench to L&E Section, ATLANTA BAR ASS’N LAB. 
& EMPL. L. SEC. NEWS, p. 6 (Fall 2019) (discussing the standing order). For a critique of that 
system from the plaintiffs’ bar perspective, see A. Lee Parks and Edward D. Buckley, The 
Vanishing Jury Trial in Employment Litigation, PARKS CHESIN & WALBERT BLOG (Nov. 14, 
2013), http://www.pcwlawfirm.com/vanishing-jury-trial-employment-litigation/. For a 
further history of the magistrate referral rule and subsequent modifications thereto, see Pippen 
v. Georgia-Pacific Gypsum LLC, No. 1:07-CV-1565-BBM/AJB, 2009 WL 10670620, at *6–
7 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 11, 2009). 
 274. For an illuminating discussion of the important differences between a Special 
Master and a United States Magistrate Judge, see David R. Cohen, Special Masters Versus 
Magistrate Judges: No Contest, 61 FED. LAW. 73, 74–75 (2014). 
 275. See Scheindlin & Redgrave, supra note 245, at 35 & n. 9; Kaufman, supra note 254, 
at 458. 
 276. The Western District of Washington was another federal district court that used a 
magistrate referral rule, which was upheld against challenge. White v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 
652 F.2d 913, 914 (9th Cir. 1981). For another variation on this theme – one not as well 
structured as the Northern District of Georgia’s and thus one that was ultimately invalidated, 
see Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 507 F.2d 1378 (7th Cir.1974)—and for a later success 
story, see Baer v. First Options of Chi., Inc., No. 90 C 7207, 1994 WL 53777 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 
18, 1994). 
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But can this Title VII practice have any validity under the ADA? 
Indeed, it can. The original authority for the Northern District’s referral rule 
came from Section 706(f) — 
(5) It shall be the duty of the judge designated pursuant to 
this subsection to assign the case for hearing at the earliest 
practicable date and to cause the case to be in every way 
expedited. If such judge has not scheduled the case for trial 
within one hundred and twenty days after issue has been 
joined, that judge may appoint a master pursuant to rule 
53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.277 
—and the ADA expressly incorporates Section 706 of Title 
VII.278 Of course, the reference for purposes of resolving the 
medical issues inherent in a direct-threat defense does not 
require a statutory provision to allow it. It is simply 
informative for U.S. District Chief Judges to note that the 
use of special masters specifically in connection with ADA 
proceedings was, indeed, recognized and generally 
permitted in the statute.279 If permitted for this general 
purpose, it seems all the more appropriate to permit it for the 
specific purpose described in this article. It is time for the 
Local Rules Committee of each federal district to consider 
how to improve the resolution of “direct-threat” cases under 
the ADA by instituting a reference system for tri-partite 
medical review. 
C. Employer Use of Pre-and-Post-Employment Arbitration 
Agreements to Establish a Tri-Partite Direct Threat Process 
When the author entered law school thirty-four years ago, it was 
virtually unheard of for EDL claims to be the subject of private arbitration. 
Indeed, the leading precedent at the time, focused on the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA), strongly suggested that even collectively-bargained 
arbitration clauses did not require that an individual union member’s claims 
under the EDLs be submitted to arbitration.280 But since the focus has 
changed from the NLRA to the Federal Arbitration Act,281 the U.S. Supreme 
                                               
 277. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(5)(2016) (emphasis added). 
 278. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a)(2016). 
 279. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(5) (2016); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a)(2016). 
 280. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56 (1974), where Mr. Justice 
Powell wrote for a unanimous Court. 
 281. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, 500 U.S. 20, 25–26 & n.2(1991) (holding, inter 
alia, that the exclusion in Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) for “contracts of employment of 
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate 
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Court, charting revolutionary course, has wrought has sea-change in the 
law.282 Now, it appears that any employment discrimination claim, at least 
under the federal EDLs, can be subjected to arbitration by either pre-
employment agreements between employer and applicant283 or post-
employment agreements between employer and employee,284 or even by 
agreements between a representative of a group of employees, such a labor 
union, who may waive the individual rights of its members to pursue their 
own individual claims against the employer and instead require them to be 
arbitrated under a collective bargaining agreement.285 Congress provided a 
further buttress for courts to enforce mandatory arbitration agreements where 
employees and applicants sought to assert EDL claims in courts through a 
provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.286 Not surprisingly, this can include 
claims under the ADA.287 Most recently, the court in 2018 has extended this 
line of cases to include enforcement of employer-employee agreements that 
not only require EDL claims to be resolved exclusively by arbitration, but 
                                               
commerce” did not apply to an arbitration agreement contained in securities representative’s 
securities registration application). 
 282. With dramatic practical results: “In the early 1990s such agreements covered only 
2% of non-unionised workplaces; today they cover more than half.” Shut Out by the Small 
Print—The Problem with the Craze for Mandatory Arbitration: Millions Of American 
Employees Have No Recourse to the Courts, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 27, 2018, at 10. 
 283. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 120 (2001). For a predictive 
account of how mandatory arbitration would expand after Gilmer, see Dennis R. Nolan, 
Employment Arbitration After Circuit City, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 853 (2003). 
 284. See, e.g., Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 21, 26. 
 285. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 258 (2009); Safrit v. Cone Mills Corp., 
248 F.3d 306, 307–08 (4th Cir. 2001) (individual EDL claims “clear[ly] and ummistakab[ly]” 
subject to collective bargaining agreement’s arbitration clause cannot be asserted by employee 
in federal court even when union declines to seek arbitration of the claims). 
 286. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1081, 1081 
(captioned “Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution”) (“Where appropriate and to the extent 
authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including settlement 
negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials, and arbitration, is 
encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of Federal law amended 
by this title.”); see Pat K. Chew, Arbitral and Judicial Proceedings: Indistinguishable Justice 
or Justice Denied, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 185, 188–90 (2011); see generally Angelito 
Remo Sevilla, The End of Duffield and the Rise of Mandatory Arbitration: How Courts 
Misinterpreted the Civil Rights Act’s Arbitration Provision, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 323 (2005) 
(discussing the popularity of alternative dispute resolution systems in employment 
discrimination suits); For discussion of § 118’s legislative history, see EEOC v. Luce, 
Forward, Hamilton, & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994, 1011–12 (9th Cir. 2002) (Pregerson, J., 
dissenting), and EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton, & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 754, 759–61 
(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
 287. See generally EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002) (where the 
principal issue was whether such agreements also bind the EEOC, which the court held they 
did not). 
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prohibit the arbitration from proceeding as a class action, limiting each 
employee to arbitrating his or her own individual claim.288 
As the author recently suggested in another article concerning a 
different EDL context, the rise of mandatory arbitration of EDLs289 can be an 
opportunity for those supporting the goals of EDLs to make sweet lemonade 
out of what seemed at first to be simply a pile of lemons.290 For both 
employees and employers, particularly those whose businesses involve jobs 
that are safety-sensitive, arbitration can provide the opportunity to avoid the 
problems inherent in submitting direct-threat issues to judges or juries.291 By 
means of both pre-employment and post-employment arbitration agreements, 
                                               
 288. Epic Sys. Corp. v Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612 (May 21, 2018) (holding that NLRA did 
not prohibit enforcement of such agreements under the FAA). The remarkably casual way that 
such agreements can be formed in our 21st century virtual world is worth noting here: 
On April 2, 2014, Epic Systems sent an email to some of its employees. The 
email contained an arbitration agreement mandating that wage-and-hour claims 
could be brought only through individual arbitration and that the employees 
waived “the right to participate in or receive money or any other relief from 
any class, collective, or representative proceeding.” The agreement included a 
clause stating that if the “Waiver of Class and Collective Claims” was 
unenforceable, “any claim brought on a class, collective, or representative 
action basis must be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction.” It also said that 
employees were “deemed to have accepted this Agreement” if they 
“continue[d] to work at Epic.” Epic gave employees no option to decline if they 
wanted to keep their jobs. The email requested that recipients review the 
agreement and acknowledge their agreement by clicking two buttons. The 
following day, Jacob Lewis, then a “technical writer” at Epic, followed those 
instructions for registering his agreement. 
 
Lewis v. Epic Sys Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 138 S.Ct. 1612 (May 21, 
2018). 
 289. It might be more accurately described as a “proliferation,” not merely a “rise.” For 
the latest data at the time this article was prepared for publication, see J.S. Colvin, Report: The 
Growing Use Of Mandatory Arbitration—Access To The Courts Is Now Barred For More 
Than 60 Million American Workers, ECON. POL’Y INST. (April 6, 2018), 
https://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-use-of-mandatory-arbitration-access-to-the-
courts-is-now-barred-for-more-than-60-million-american-workers/. 
 290. Van Detta, supra note 139, at 927–38 & nn. 141–69 (2015). 
 291. The FAA itself excludes many employees in the railway and airline industries from 
its coverage under 9 U.S.C. § 1’s provision “but nothing herein contained shall apply to 
contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged 
in foreign or interstate commerce,” which the U.S. Supreme Court in Circuit City construed 
to really mean “transportation workers” engaged in interstate commerce. See Circuit City 
Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119–20 (2002). Of course, the tripartite medical review 
process is typically encompassed within traditional adjust board proceedings provided for by 
collective bargaining agreements (CBA) negotiated between labor organizations and 
employers for employees and applicants working in recognized bargaining units. However, 
for employees of railroads and airlines who are not part of a recognized, union-represented 
bargaining unit, it appears that the FAA – and its decisional progeny – wo not provide the 
basis for compelling enforcement of arbitration agreements. However, the 1991 Civil Rights 
Act’s § 118 may provide enough of a foundation to compel arbitration in interstate 
transportation industries for workers who are not otherwise subject to a CBA. 
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direct-threat issues can be committed to the kind of tripartite medical review 
process already well-established a half-century ago, as Gunther292 taught us, 
in the railroad and airline industries.293 This can reduce—perhaps quite 
substantially—the jurisprudence of doubt that has arisen from the dissonant 
case law examined throughout this article. Of course, the direct-threat 
decision is no more appropriately made by a typical arbitrator than it is to be 
made by a federal judge or a federal-court jury. Thus, any such arbitration 
agreement, or modification of an existing arbitration agreement, needs to 
spell out in detail the tri-partite medical review process. While exploring the 
details and nuances of such a provision would be the appropriate subject for 
an entirely separate article, it suffices here to say that there are many 
exemplars available in the collectively bargained medical review processes 
that have long endured in the railroad and airline industries. 
IV. CONCLUSION:  PLUS ÇA CHANGE, PLUS C’EST LA MEME CHOSE 
The federal courts have heard many ADA cases since the author 
wrote about the “direct-threat” standard in 1999. Yet, in that nearly 20-year 
period, they have managed to compile a rather sorry record. Of the major 
issues that were outstanding 20 years ago, only the issue of whether “threat 
to self” as well as “threat to others” has been resolved, and it took the U.S. 
Supreme Court to do that in the only ADA “direct-threat” case they have 
heard during that time. As for other issues—even as basic as who bears the 
burden to prove “direct threat”—the U.S. Appeals Courts occupy badly 
dissonant space and have left the landscape filled with uncertainty – and 
expensive litigation. Most importantly, the federal courts have no coherent 
conception of how the process of determining the issue of direct-threat in 
ADA Title I cases. Without such a coherent conception, we are left with a 
maze of unpersuasive and half-thought-through answers to the fundamental 
questions about the ADA’s direct-threat standard that intrigued the author 20 
years ago: “Who’s the decider, and what is the decider supposed to decide?” 
The EEOC has done little better. It has issued no additional 
regulations to illuminate the “direct-threat” standard beyond the original 
regulation it promulgated nearly 30 years ago – in 1991, during the 
administration of President George H.W. Bush who signed the ADA into 
law. 
Congress, on the other hand, did make a sea-change course 
correction in the way that federal courts had perversely made virtually every 
ADA case about whether the plaintiff was even protected under the Act – a 
draw-dropping anomaly that Congress vigorously corrected in the ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008, which George H.W. Bush’s son, President George 
W. Bush, signed into law during his last year in office. However, as laudable 
                                               
 292. Gunther v. San Diego & Ariz. E. Ry. Co., 382 U.S. 257, 258–62 (1965). 
 293. See, e.g., John F. Foster, Comment, Review of Adjustment Board Awards Under the 
Railway Labor Act, 34 J. AIR L. & COMM. 233 (1968). 
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as the 2008 Amendments Act was, it did not address the continuing problems 
with the “direct-threat” standard, which remain little more illuminated today 
than when this author first encountered them in practice during the mid-
1990s. Thus, one might be forgiven, as Justice Jackson once wrote, of feeling 
as if, at the end of the day, one is exiting through the same door by which 
they entered – which itself is simply another, classically American way, of 
saying, “Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.”294 
 Undeterred, the author has renewed the call for a sensible process 
for resolving direct-threat issues in ADA cases, particularly in the numerous 
safety-sensitive industries that we encounter interminably in the modernity 
of our 21st century lives. The author has shown the way for the EEOC to use 
its regulatory power; for federal district courts to use their authority to 
appoint special masters; and for employers to use their vastly enlarged field 
to force issues out of court and into arbitration, in order to make tri-partite 
medical review not only the signature process in Railway Labor Act 
industries of railways and airlines, but across the board for direct-threat 
issues in all sectors of employment. If the author is so fortunate as to thrive 
over the next two decades, he hopes in another 20 years to be able to report 
then on real progress towards an ADA in which direct-threat issues are 
resolved logically, fairly, coherently, and informedly, correctly considering 
the needs of our disabled population to find and keep employment and to be 
free from stereotypes, while at the same time protecting everyone within a 
zone of danger created by a direct-threat from the kind of unhappy end that 
befell a 144 passengers and crew on a routine flight from Barcelona to 
Dusseldorf in 2015. For tragedies such as that, we never want to have to say, 
“Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.” Nor do we ever want to hear 
another airline captain again shout the anguished words heard on 
Germanwings Flight 9525, “For the love of God! Open this door!” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 294. “The more things change, the more they remain the same.” JOHN BARTLETT, 
BARTLETT’S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS, at 514 ¶5 (Emily Morison Beck, ed. 15th ed. 1980) (quote 
from Alphonse Karr (1808–1890), Les Guepes (Janvier 1849)). 
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APPENDIX 
 
295. Amego, 110 F.3d at 144.The Amego panel’s statement, however, was qualified – 
although inscrutably so: 
Where those essential job functions necessarily implicate the safety of others, 
plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that 
does not endanger others. There may be other cases under Title I where the 
issue of direct threat is not tied to the issue of essential job functions but is 
purely a matter of defense, on which the defendant would bear the burden. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). The court did not elaborate on this cryptic statement. Over a decade 
later, the First Circuit considered whether a similar “direct threat” concept under the Maine 
Human Rights Act (MHRA) should be treated as plaintiff’s burden to prove she is not a direct 
                                                             
Circuit Party With Burden Case Authority 
1st Usually Plaintiff EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135, 144 
(1st Cir. 1997)295 
2nd Defendant Lovejoy–Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, 
Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 220 (2d Cir.2001)296 
3rd Undecided New Directions Treatment Servs. v. 
Reading, 490 F.3d 293, 306 n.9 (2007)297  
4th Uncertain No 4th Circuit Appeals Court opinion 
decides.298 
5th Inconclusive Rizzo v. Children’s World Learning Ctrs, 
213 F.3d 209 (5th Cir. 2000) (en banc);  
Nall v. BNSF Railroad Company, 917 
F.3d 335, 343 n. 5 (5th Cir. 2019)299 
6th Undecided Wurzel v. Whirlpool, 482 Fed.Appx. 1, 12 
n.14 (6th Cir. 2012)300 
7th Defendant Branham v. Snow, 392 F.3d 896, 906 (7th 
Cir.2004)301 
8th Defendant EEOC v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 477 F.3d 
561, 571 (8th Cir.2007) 
9th  Defendant Echazabal v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 336 
F.3d 1023, 1027 (9th Cir.2003) 
10th It Depends Jarvis v. Potter, 500 F.3d 1113, 1122 
(10th Cir. 2007)302 
11th  Plaintiff Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 
446, 447 (11th Cir.1996)303 
D.C.  Undecided Taylor v. Rice, 451 F.3d 898, 905–06 
(D.C.Cir.2006)304 
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threat, or defendant’s burden to prove that she was, and came to a different conclusion, while 
not undertaking a re-examination of Amego’s reasoning: 
The district court reasoned that, whatever the interpretation of the federal 
statute, the Maine Law Court had recently ruled that the MHRA and the ADA 
were not to be construed identically. Indeed the Maine Act, on some issues, is 
more protective of those with disabilities. 
The district court pointed out that the ADA and the MHRA are different and 
that the MHRA had explicitly assigned safety concerns to the category of a 
defense. See Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 4573–A(1–B). It also noted that (unlike 
the ADA’s “direct threat” provision, which this circuit interpreted in Amego) 
the MHRA explicitly codifies as an affirmative defense the situation in which 
an individual “pose[s] a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals 
in the workplace.” Id. § 4573–A(1–A). Further, when the Maine legislature 
amended the MHRA in 1996, it reenacted the safety defense, which had 
previously existed under a heading entitled “Not unlawful employment 
discrimination,” under a heading entitled “Defenses.” 1996 Me. Legis. Serv. 
ch. 511, § 1. All of these factors, the district court concluded, indicated that the 
burden of proving safety risk under Maine law rested solely with the defendant. 
The placement of the burden as to any safety risk posed by a disability raises 
significant public policy concerns about the best way to protect both the public 
and the disabled. It is entirely reasonable, as the district court said, that Maine 
law would strike the balance in one direction and federal law the other. 
Definitive resolution of the direction Maine chooses, however, is most 
appropriately directed to the Maine courts and the Maine legislature, not the 
federal courts. 
 
Warren v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 518 F.3d 93, 99-100 (1st Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). 
 296. Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 220 (2d Cir. 2001); 
accord, Hargrave v. Vermont, 340 F.3d 27, 35 (2d Cir. 2003). The Lovejoy court cited to 
specific legislative history of the ADA. See Lovejoy-Wilson, 263 F.3d at 220 (citing H.R.Rep. 
No. 101–485, pt. 3, at 46 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 469); but see Sista v. 
CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 170 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Although the parties disagree 
as to which party bears the burden of proving or disproving that an employee poses a direct 
threat and disagree as to whether this Court, in Lovejoy-Wilson, held that the ‘poses a direct 
threat defense’ is an affirmative defense to be proven by the defendant, we need not address 
this issue, given our resolution of the this case.”). 
 297. New Directions Treatment Servs. v. City of Reading, 490 F.3d 293, 306 n.9 (3rd 
Cir. 2007). The Third Circuit appears to have developed evasion of this question into a 
strategic art: 
[C]ourts have not come to an agreement . . . as to where the burden [of 
significant risk] lies. . . . We have previously reserved judgment on this issue 
when it was ‘unnecessary to decide this question,’ and do so again in this case 
as it would not affect our holding.” 
 
Id. (citing Donahue v. Consol. Rail Corp., 224 F.3d 226, 230 (3d. Cir. 2000)). 
 298. Darcangelo v. Verizon Commc’n, Inc., 292 F.3d 181, 188 (4th Cir. 2002). However, 
there is at least one discussion of the issue by the Fourth Circuit in dicta: 
Presumably, Darcangelo is suggesting that Verizon planned to fire her but 
feared liability under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990(ADA), If 
that was Verizon’s fear, it would have had an affirmative defense against an 
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ADA discrimination claim if it could have proven that Darcangelo posed a 
“direct threat,” specifically, “a significant risk to the health or safety of others 
that [could not] be eliminated by reasonable accommodation,” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 11211(3). See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b).) 
 
Id. (dictum) (cited in Taylor v. Hampton Rds. Reg’l Jail Auth., 550 F.Supp.2d 614, 620 
(E.D.Va. 2008) and relied upon in Cousin v. United States, 230 F.Supp.3d 475, 492 n. 11 
(E.D. Va. 2017)) ( “[I]t is ‘unclear on the face of the statute itself which party bears the burden 
in a ‘direct threat’ analysis. Construing the statute as the Fourth Circuit has in Darcangelo . . . 
, the Court concludes that, [the defendant] has the burden of establishing that [plaintiff] 
presented a direct threat to himself or others.’”); see also Anderson v. Consol. Coal Co., 636 
F. App’x. 175, 181-183 (4th Cir. 2016)(construing similar provisions of W. Va. Code R. 
§§ 77–1–4.7, 77-1-4.8) (“Section 77–1–4.8 then provides that [i]n deciding whether an 
individual poses a direct threat to health and safety, the employer has the burden of 
demonstrating that a reasonable probability of a materially enhanced risk of substantial harm 
to the health or safety of the individual or others cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable 
accommodation.’ . . . Although the role of § 77–1–4.8 within the shifting-burden analysis used 
for employment discrimination claims is not entirely clear, we will assume that the section 
becomes applicable when, in response to an employee’s prima facie case, the employer asserts 
that an employee cannot safely perform her job as a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for 
termination.”); Montalvo v. Radcliffe, 167 F.3d 873 (4th Cir. 1999)(in ADA Title II public 
accommodations claim, treating “direct threat” as a matter of defense for defendant to 
establish). District court opinions from within the Fourth Circuit that the author has located 
and read suggest that the district courts are viewing “direct threat” as an affirmative defense 
to be pleaded and proved by the employer. For example, in Searls v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 
158 F.Supp.3d 427 (D. Md. 2016), a hearing impaired nurse applicant who required a full-
time American Sign Language (ASL) interpreter to perform the nursing job sued the employer 
under the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because the employer withdrew an 
offer of employment to her allegedly in part because her disability posed a “direct threat” to 
patient care, even with the aid of an ASL interpreter. Id. at 430, 431, 433. The employer argued 
that “that some alarms were only auditory and argues that ‘[i]t would have been a significant 
patient safety risk to rely on an interpreter, without any nursing training, to engage in nursing 
judgment by determining which alarm was sounding and to rely on the interpreter’s judgment 
to determine when a patient emergency was occurring, requiring nursing assistance.’” Id. at 
439. The court ruled that “[b]ecause JHH did not raise patient safety concerns until after Searls 
brought the lawsuit, because the issue of patient safety is absent from contemporaneous 
communications concerning the reason for denying Searls an ASL interpreter, and because the 
only explanation JHH gave to Searls for revoking her job offer was the cost of providing a 
full-time interpreter, JHH has not met its burden on its direct threat defense.” Id. at 440; accord 
EEOC v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 917 F.Supp. 419, 427-29 (W.D. Va. 1996). 
 299. Initially, the Fifth Circuit, in a panel decision, saw the “direct threat” inquiry clearly 
as an employer’s affirmative defense to prove or lose. See Rizzo v. Children’s World Learning 
Ctrs, 84 F.3d 758, 764 (5th Cir. 1996)(“ An employee who is a direct threat is not a qualified 
individual with a disability. As with all affirmative defenses, the employer bears the burden 
of proving that the employee is a direct threat.”). Two years later, following a remand and a 
fresh appeal, the Rizzo case went en banc, and the en banc court backed off the previous panel 
declaration. The Rizzo en banc majority explained this ambivalence as a kind of abstention: 
The question of who bears the burden of establishing that an individual’s 
disability poses a direct health or safety threat to the disabled employee or 
others is not a simple one. A number of cases either hold or suggest that direct 
threat is an affirmative defense on which the defendant ordinarily has the 
burden of proof. Other cases hold to the contrary. Because neither side objected 
to either of the district court’s instructions described above, we review this 
challenge for plain error. 
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*** 
In allocating the burden of proof to the defendant to establish its defense, the 
district judge carefully followed the marching orders we gave him in Rizzo I. 
In this circumstance we are therefore unable to say the district court committed 
error at all. But, if we assume that the district court somehow committed error, 
it certainly was not plain or “obvious” error and we need not resolve the burden 
of proof issue raised for the first time on appeal. 
 
Id. at 212-213. The en banc majority elaborated on its view in a footnote: 
It is unclear from the statutory scheme who has the burden on this issue. It may 
depend on the facts of the particular case. The EEOC suggested at argument 
that where the essential job duties necessarily implicate the safety of others, the 
burden may be on the plaintiff to show that she can perform those functions 
without endangering others; but, where the alleged threat is not so closely tied 
to the employee’s core job duties, the employer may bear the burden. None of 
these issues were raised in the district court and all we decide today is that the 
district court did not commit plain error in its charge. 
 
Id. at 213 n.4 (citations omitted). In a three-judge dissent, Judge Edith Hollan Jones vigorously 
argued for the burden to be placed squarely on the plaintiff. See id. at 215–23 (Jones, J. 
dissenting). The en banc court’s “punt” in 2000 appears to remain the current state of affairs 
in the Fifth Circuit. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Mueller Copper Tube Co., Inc., No.1:10CV307–
SA–SAA, 2012 WL 1192125, at *7 n.5 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 10, 2012). Professor Stephen Befort 
has pointed out the oddity of the approach left behind by the Rizzo en banc majority’s views: 
The Fifth Circuit, meanwhile, appears to slice the burden of proof from the 
opposite direction. In Rizzo v. Children’s World Learning Center, the Fifth 
Circuit ruled that the employee generally bears the burden to prove that she is 
a qualified individual who does not pose a direct threat to herself or others.148 
But, the Fifth Circuit went on to state that “when a court finds that the safety 
requirements imposed [by an employer] tend to screen out the disabled, then 
the burden of proof shifts to the employer, to prove that the employee is, in 
fact, a direct threat.” 
 
See Befort, supra note 74, at 28-29.  Recently, the Fifth Circuit was presented with another 
opportunity to clarify its position, but studiously declined to do so.  Nall v. BNSF Railroad 
Company, 917 F.3d 335, 343 n. 5 (5th Cir. 2019)(In Rizzo, “we declined to reach the question 
of which party bears the burden of establishing that an individual’s disability poses 
a direct health or safety threat to the disabled employee or others.  We do so again here. Even 
assuming arguendo that the burden is Nall’s, at this stage, he has satisfied it.”).  Pondering the 
Fifth Circuit’s puzzling confirmation of nearly two decades of avoidance, one is reminded of 
the famous observation attributed to Justice Kennedy that “[l]iberty finds no refuge in a 
jurisprudence of doubt.”  Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.)).  Neither do 
the policies of the ADA.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) &(b). 
 300. The Sixth Circuit squarely confronted the issue and then punted, refusing to decide 
it: 
However, we need not resolve the issue of whether the burden is Wurzel’s as 
part of his obligation to show that he is a “qualified” individual with a disability 
(by showing that he is not a direct threat to safety in the workplace), or whether 
the burden is Whirlpool’s as part of an asserted affirmative defense (that the 
plaintiff was a direct threat to safety). Regardless of which party possesses the 
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burden of proof on this point, as explained below, the district court’s 
conclusion that Wurzel presented a direct threat is correct as a matter of law. 
 
Wurzel v. Whirlpool Corp., 482 F. App’x 1, 12 n.14 (6th Cir. 2012). This is a particularly 
surprising rationale for avoidance. The kind of determinations required for the direct-threat 
issue hardly seemed well-suited to be decided “as matters of law,” and it is hard to see how a 
standard that includes at its heart a soft, multi-factored balancing test can ever be appropriately 
decided “as a matter of law” – unless either one party had an evidentiary burden that it did not 
meet, or the plaintiff worked in a safety-sensitive industry subject to government regulation 
that required a government-issued certification (such as an Airman’s Certificate for a 
commercial airline pilot) that the plaintiff either lacked or had possessed but then lost through 
revocation. At least one district court within the 6th Circuit had held some years before that 
the employer bore the burden to prove “direct threat” as an affirmative defense to a plaintiff’s 
claim of discrimination. EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1164, 1171, 1172-1173 (E.D. 
Mich. 1996) (enjoining “Chrysler’s policy of not authorizing employment for an individual 
with a blood sugar level of greater than 140 mg/dl” because it “is a blanket exclusion” not 
based on the individualized assessments required by the ADA), rev’d mem. on other grounds, 
172 F.3d 48 (6th Cir. 1998). More recent district court decisions, citing the unpublished 
decision in Wurzel, recognize that the issue is an undecided one in the 6th Circuit – one that a 
district court recently described as “puzzling”. Jennings v. Dow Corning Corp., No. 12-12227, 
2013 WL 1962333, at *11 n. 9, (E.D. Mich. May 10, 2013). 
 301. Accord Dadian v. Vill. of Wilmette, 269 F.3d 831, 841 (7th Cir. 2001); but see 
Bekker v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., 229 F.3d 662, 668 (7th Cir. 2000)(apparently approving 
of district court’s analysis, which included statement that physician plaintiff bore burden of 
proving she was not a direct threat to health or safety of patients). 
 302. The Jarvis court elaborated: 
 
Courts generally have held that the existence of a direct threat is a defense 
to be proved by the employer. We have recognized an exception to the 
general rule: “[W]here the essential job duties necessarily implicate the 
safety of others, then the burden may be on the plaintiff to show that she 
can perform those functions without endangering others.” McKenzie v. 
Benton, 388 F.3d 1342, 1354 (10th Cir.2004) . . . (plaintiff was police 
officer) . . . That exception is inappropriate in this case because the 
essential duties of a Postal Service custodian do not “necessarily implicate 
the safety of others.” 
 
Jarvis v. Potter, 500 F.3d 113, 1122 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). 
 303. Accord LaChance v. Duffy’s Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 835 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 304. The case was brought by a prospective employee who claimed that State Department 
violated Rehabilitation Act when it refused to hire him as Foreign Service Officer because he 
was HIV-positive. Taylor v. Rice, 451 F.3d 898, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2006).The case has at least 
some predictive relevance to the ADA because “[t]he statute instructs courts to use the 
‘standards’ of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, to 
evaluate a complaint like Taylor’s ‘alleging nonaffirmative action employment 
discrimination.’ 29 U.S.C. § 791(g); see 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(b) (applying the regulations set 
forth in 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 to claims under § 501).” Id. at 905. The panel, however, ultimately 
dodged the issue by saying both that “[i]n light of our disposition, we need not decide who 
bears the burden of proving that the plaintiff poses a direct threat to his health or safety” and 
that “[t]he parties did not argue the issue.” Id. at 905 n.14. Shortly after the D.C. Circuit issued 
its Taylor opinion, Judge Rosemary Collyer of the District Court for the District of Columbia 
cited her previous district court decision in Taylor favorably for the proposition that an 
employer bears the burden of proving that a disabled individual was properly excluded from 
employment under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 for posing a “direct threat.” Clayborne v. 
Potter, 448 F.Supp.2d 485, (D.D.C. 2006) (“see also Taylor v. Rice, No. 03–1832, 2005 WL 
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913221, at *11 (D.D.C. April 20, 2005) (“An employer may escape liability under the 
Rehabilitation Act if it can establish that the employee poses a direct threat to himself or others 
in the workplace”), rev’d on other grounds, 451 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 2006)”). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
